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In the substantial body of literature that has been written about the Panic of 1837, two schools of thought have 
become dominant. One focuses on domestic factors such as Andrew Jackson’s Specie Circular and legislation to 
distribute the federal surplus, while the other focuses on an international shock stemming from changes in the Bank 
of England’s lending policies. Although there is compelling evidence supporting each of the theories, the Panic 
remains imperfectly understood. This paper uses new bank-level data to econometrically test each of the existing 
theories and to explore an additional trigger. I find that the effects of the distribution to be overemphasized and that 
while some evidence supports the theory focused on international factors, the data strongly suggests that the Panic 






















The decade building up to financial panic that punctuated Andrew Jackson’s controversial career fascinates 
scholars for several reasons.  The United States economy was booming as land sales, investment in state 
infrastructure, and trade with Britain reached historic heights. As consumer confidence swelled, so did speculation, 
and the mild inflation that began at the start of the decade intensified. Politics proved to be equally sensational, 
starting with Jackson’s veto of the rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States. The ensuing ‘Bank War’ 
only intensified the longstanding disagreements over federal regulation of the banking system and served to 
crystallize the formation of the opposition Whig Party; political polarization only increased with Jackson's 
experimentation with the pet banking system. The Panic, which came at the height of the boom, served as a dramatic 
end to the turbulent decade. It is not surprising that ever since, it has been the focus of considerable scholarship. 
In the aftermath of the Panic, understanding the crisis became a polarizing political issue. Democratic 
Republicans blamed speculators for fueling the land boom, banks for the unscrupulous monitoring of their own 
balance sheets, and the “panic makers” in the opposition party for conspiring to bring about political change.1 On the 
other hand, Whigs blamed the veto of the re-chartering of the Second Bank of the United States, the subsequent 
removal of its deposits into state depositories, and Jackson’s Specie Circular for fueling inflation and the Panic.  
Their explanation, which would eventually become the ‘traditional’ interpretation of the Panic, held that the veto of 
the re-chartering of the Second Bank of the United States led to an overexpansion of the banking system that fueled 
reckless growth in public land sales. Jackson’s Specie Circular and the Deposit Act were the straw that finally broke 
the camel's back.  It was not until Peter Temin’s groundbreaking use of cliometrics in his 1967 book, The 
Jacksonian Economy, that the narrative experienced a shift. He not only found the sources of the Panic to be outside 
of the United States itself, but additionally exonerated Jackson and his policies from any significant responsibility. 
Temin observed that the reserve ratio of the banking system had not fallen below its 1833 levels, as it should have 
state banks were overextended credit after being freed from the SBUS. Instead, he traces attributes the inflation to an 
increase in the supply of specie from abroad.  Although his work remains the standard interpretation of the Panic, 
significant emendations have been made by Engerman (1970) and Hugh Rockoff (1971), and in recent decades 
scholars such as Peter Rousseau (2002) and Jane Knodell (2006) have even provided new evidence in support of the 
traditionalists argument.  
                                                
1 “Panic makers” are referred to in Lepler(2013: 184). Evidence on the Democrats blaming the Panic on bankers are found in Lepler(2013: 200), 
and Schreiber (1963:213) who quotes letter by Jackson “Every day that the directors of these Banks [the state banks] met with their boards they 
knew their liabilities and their assets… They were repeatedly and earnestly cautioned by the Treasury Department not to over issue… Still, in 
open violation of all obligation, they suspended specie payment in a time of profound peace, robbed the Treasury of millions of dollars.” original 
source, “Maryland Historical Magazine, VIII, Treasury Circular of July 3, 1837, Letters to Banks Treasury Correspondence. Amos Kendall to 
John Thompson, July 1 1837.   
Lepler documents multiple cases where the democrats believed that the suspension was a Whig conspiracy. Andrew Jackson “all the Whig papers 
from New York to Louisiana recommending the suspension at the same time, and then suddenly as a waterspout, suspension of specie payments 
from one end of this content to another’ Lepler (2013, 210) Jackson to martin van buren June 6 1837, reel 23 , MVBLOC. Lepler also documents 
Bennetts’s article in the Courier and Enquirer who printed an article a day before the suspensions, with the belief that the banks were conspiring 
with each other to suspend specie to bring about political change. Lepler( 2013:199) 
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  Today there exists a general consensus that the inflationary boom of the 1830s was in large part due to the 
rapid expansion in the monetary base from the inflow of specie from abroad.2 However, it remains unclear what 
exactly triggered the Panic. This uncertainty exists despite the wealth of literature for a multitude of reasons. For 
one, the literature has limited the scope of the analysis to focusing largely on the Second Bank of the United States 
and the inflation. But more importantly, in the 130 years since the Panic, there have been significant changes in the 
availability of data and the methodology with which to analyze it. Temin (1969) was the first to utilize quantitative 
evidence in the form of regional balance sheets. Building off of his argument, Rousseau (2001) and Knodell (2006) 
have also incorporated a greater amount of quantitative evidence. However, like Temin they only analyze the data at 
the regional level. Although extremely insightful in exploring the wider macroeconomic effects, there are limitations 
in the conclusions that could be drawn, because regional aggregates obscure the variation within the experiences of 
individual banks. Additionally, there have been significant changes in the way we understand banking crises. As 
Calomiris and Gorton (1991) suggest, they are no longer understood as inherent parts of the business cycle or a 
suboptimal feature of banking debt contracts, but rather stem from weaknesses that arise from a lack of important 
institutional structures. Exogenous shocks are no longer sufficient explanations for financial panics.   
Utilizing firm-level data in the form of individual bank balance sheets and monthly banknote discounts, as 
well as new theories of financial panics, this thesis seeks to take a fresh look at the events surrounding the Panic of 
1837. More specifically, I test the assertions of previous scholars and explore the possibility that the Panic was due 
to the loss of confidence in the Democratic Pet banking system. To do this at the firm level, I analyze the differences 
in the impact of the Panic on the assets, liabilities, and quoted banknote discounts for different banks. The results 
suggest that the transfers in 1836 and 1837 had a much smaller effect than what is described in the literature and in 
some cases was correlated with better outcomes. Theories pertaining to Temin’s (1969) argument are somewhat less 
conclusive. Although the states with the highest increases in banknote discount after the Panic include many major 
cotton producers, they also had significant public land sales and may have suffered from the bursting of a land 
bubble. The findings at all levels of analysis most convincingly suggest that the Panic was related to a loss of 
confidence in Jackson’s pet banks. In terms of deposits and banknote discounts, I find that deposit banks were more 
adversely affected after the Panic. Additionally, the more politically connected deposit banks in the Mid-Atlantic 
saw statically significant decreases for all balance sheet items, and a larger increase in their bank note discount.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents historical background on Jacksonian banking and 
the Panic of 1837.  Section three is a review of the literature, focusing specifically on the proximate causes of the 
Panic.  Section four gives a very brief overview of all the collected data and the general empirical strategy. I also 
discuss what we would expect to see in the results given each of the theories presented in the past literature. The 
remainder of the discussion of the data and results is broken down into five separate sections corresponding to four 
levels of analysis: section five focuses on the balance sheets of New York banks, section six expands the analysis of 
balance sheets to include all banks in the United States, section seven explores the interbank payments network, 
section eight looks at the banknote discounts of all U.S banks and section nine looks at bank failures. Section ten 
concludes the paper by tying together the results and discussions in the preceding sections. 
                                                
2 Wallis (2002), Williams(2016), Sylla (2001), Weber(2000) 
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II. Background 
II.a. Politics and Banking 
In the early nineteenth century, banking was a highly politicized issue at both the state and national level.   
State governments were actively involved in the chartering and regulation of banks. Because the number of charters 
was significantly restricted, obtaining one was particularly difficult and often required political bargaining or 
bribery. The privileged few that were able to obtain a charter would receive monopoly rents and could provide party 
supporters with disproportionate credit and ownership.3  New York was a particularly acute example of this. In the 
1830s, The Democratic party machine known as the “Albany Regency” strictly controlled the banking system and 
only granted charters to their political allies, who in turn would provide them the financial support to maintain 
political clout. Between 1830 to 1837, only 53 out of the 535 applications for bank charters were granted.4  
At the national level, the Second Bank the United States (SBUS), which was the only federally chartered 
Bank, proved to be equally politicized. The Second Bank of the United States was opened in 1816 on the basis of a 
20-year charter to act as the government's sole fiscal agent. To carry out its duties, it was granted the unique 
privilege of opening multiple branches across the nation to better facilitate dispersal of revenue and financial capital, 
as well as receiving payments due to the U.S. government from custom duties, land sales and taxes. The nationwide 
branching also addressed the currency losses on interstate transfers and resulted in its notes being circulated widely 
as a national currency. Besides facilitating a majority of the country’s exchange business, the Bank also provided 
monetary stability by informally regulating state banks.  As the federal depository, the Bank accumulated large 
amounts of state bank notes when individuals paid their taxes.  The Bank could then rapidly redeem those notes at 
the state banks, which would prevent them from over issuing notes. By changing the rate at which they redeem the 
notes, the Bank was able to enforce an informal reserve ratio.5 
The SBUS got off to a rocky start under its first president, William Jones, who both poorly managed the 
distant branches of the Bank and was accused of diverting the Bank's funds to speculate in the stock market.6 
Although his replacement, Langdon Cheeves, was able to turn the Bank around under his more conservative 
management, the Bank’s true rise to prominence began after the appointment of its third president, Nicholas Biddle. 
Under his leadership, the Bank undertook an aggressive policy of expansion; by the time Jackson was up for 
reelection in 1832, the Bank had grown into a colossal financial network with twenty six branches7. At its peak, the 
Bank supplied 27 percent of the dollar value of all commercial loans, making it the largest supplier of credit in the 
                                                
3 Bodenhorn (2006: 231)  
4 Hilt (2017,66) 
5 (Catterall 1960 : 451) , Hammond(1957: 301), Timberlake (1961 : 314-41)This function of the Bank was popularized by Hammond (1957), 
however there is disagreement over how effectively the bank was at achieving this policy (Temin,1969 : 49). Importantly, it assumes that state 
banks were constantly trying to expand beyond their means, which coincides with Hammond’s interpretation of the ‘Bank War’ as struggle 
between the established capitalists dn the new upcoming entrepreneurs. However Redlich (1951:66) characterizes the 1820s and 1830s to be a 
period where banking  “amonted to a continuous process of inflation”  
6 (Rockoff, 2000 :648), Redlich (1951:129) 
7 Knodell, (2017,:chapter 3) 
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country.8 Its power would generate resentment in hard money Jacksonian Democrats and in state banks, who were 
eager to expand but were hampered by the deflationary policies of the SBUS.9 
Disagreement over the existence of a national bank and the federal government’s role in the regulation of 
state banks was not new. The SBUS faced the same rhetorical attacks as its predecessor with critics claiming that it 
infringed on states rights, that it was unconstitutional, and that it concentrated power in the hands of the mercantile 
elite and the foreign powers who had invested in a large portion of the Bank's capital stock.  The animosity towards 
the Bank came to a head as its charter was about expire.  
 
The Bank War 
In anticipation of the expiration of the SBUS’s charter in 1836, Nicholas Biddle, with the help of the U.S. 
senators Daniel Webster and Henry Clay, applied to recharter the Bank in early 1832. After a fair amount of 
lobbying, their bill passed in Congress by a wide margin, but was ultimately vetoed by President Jackson. Jackson 
had a longstanding disdain for all banks, however it did not become clear that he was intent on destroying the SBUS 
until Henry Clay, his opponent in the 1832 Presidential election, aligned himself with the Bank (Hammond, 1957: 
370).  
 In Jackson’s veto message, he attacked the Bank from multiple angles, claiming that it was a corrupt 
monopoly that only served the interests of foreign governments and privileged aristocrats.  Although the message 
mostly resonated with hard money anti-bank agrarians and supporters of state control over banking, the destruction 
of the National Bank also found support from impatient state bankers eager to be free of the SBUS’s restraints as 
well as New York bankers who were eager to seize Philadelphia's status as the nation’s financial capital. 
Rechartering the National Bank became a key issue in the presidential race between Jackson and Henry Clay.  
Although Jackson won in a landslide, the disagreements over federal regulation of the banking system continued to 
deepen political fault lines. Supporters of the National Bank, who also shared animosity towards Jackson, would 
eventually form the opposition Whig party. The following political struggle, which is now known as the “Bank 
War”, was only the beginning in a series of political regulatory interventions in the banking system.  
  
Removal of the Deposits in 1833 and Creation of the Pet Banking System 
Despite defeating the Bank’s attempts to acquire a new charter, Jackson feared that Biddle might make a 
second attempt to either override the veto or obtain a new charter by bribing Congressmen with the Bank’s funds.  
To further divorce the federal government from the SBUS, and to remove the power it wielded through holding 
federal deposits, Jackson issued an executive order in September 1833 to remove federal deposits from the Bank. 
This would return the nation to a system similar to the one it had prior to the opening of the SBUS, where the federal 
government relied on a set of state chartered banks to hold federal funds (Hammond, 1957: 227-230). Although this 
was not a new idea, the last time this strategy was deployed there were far fewer banks and the Treasury had 
                                                
8 (Knodell 2006: 551) At its peak the Bank discounted 44 million in bills on personal security and 14.8 million in bills of exchange. U.S. 
Congress. Senate. 23 Cong., 2d sess. S. Doc. 373 
9 There are many interpretations of the Bank War, Sherlinger interparty clash between working class Jacksonian Democrats and wealthy Whigs, 
Hammond, struggle between the established capitalist and a “newer, more numerous set” Hammond (1957:329) 
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Congressional consent (Gattell, 1964: 35). Since it was necessary to apportion the federal deposits on some basis, 
the possibilities for patronage were considerable, and to critics the pet banks represented the extension of the 
Jacksonian “spoils system” into banking.  
The decision was highly controversial even within Jackson’s own cabinet: he had to replace the Secretary 
of the Treasury twice before finding someone willing to carry out the removal. He finally settled on close friends 
Amos Kendall and Roger Taney, who selected seven large banks all located in cities in the major Eastern seaboard 
under the guidance of Taney’s close personal friend Thomas Ellicott, president of the Union Bank of Maryland.10 
Political favoritism and personal connections were an important part of the selection process, which was evident in 
the choice of the Union Bank of Maryland. The other banks included The Manhattan Company and The Mechanics 
Bank, which were the two largest Democratic banks in New York City; the Commonwealth Bank of Boston, whose 
president at the time was John K. Simpson, a close friend of Amos Kendall and a Democratic state politician; and 
the Girard Bank, which was one of the few banks to side against the SBUS in the Bank War. The one exception was 
the Bank of America, which had been recommended to Martin Van Buren by Cornelius Lawrence, the mayor of 
New York.11 Although the Bank of America had been a well known Federalist bank, its president, George Newbold, 
had a reputation for being a conservative banker; Taney hoped that he would take the lead in making sure the other 
deposit banks were being similarly cautious. Despite the selection of the Bank of America, the deposits were 
ultimately “in the hands of the politically friendly,” as Taney wrote to a Democratic colleague. Eventually, the 
deposit banks would become pejoratively known by its critics as Jackson's “pet banks”. 12 
In the early stages of the pet banking system, the state banks were portrayed as a temporary solution while 
Taney and Jackson focused on destroying the National Bank.  In the event that Biddle decided to retaliate against the 
pet banks, Taney secretly supplied each pet bank with a $500,000 draft with which to defend themselves.13 If Biddle 
decided to draw down their reserves by suddenly redeeming large quantities of their notes, the pet banks could 
retaliate by presenting the SBUS with bank drafts made payable to each respective pet bank. Although Taney 
encouraged the banks to increase lending on the basis of the newly received deposits, he made clear that the drafts 
were only to be used in an emergency. But to the chagrin of Taney, the pet banks had extended their loans on the 
basis of both the deposits and bank drafts, and soon found themselves deeply in debt to the National Bank. A month 
later they wrote to Taney asking for additional drafts.  Although he initially refused, the collapse of the pet banking 
system only months after its inception would have been an embasrassment.14 Revelations of the secret drafts and 
Taney’s mismanagement of the pet banks proved to be quite the embarrassment and colored the public's perception 
                                                
10  As Secretary of the Treasury, Taney would have been the one officially assigned to the role.  Some sources say that Roger B. Taney was 
responsible for the selections. Schreiber (1963 : 197) and Hammond (1957: 412) suggest both Taney and Kendall were important but Kendall 
played larger role in reaching out to bankers. McFaul, page 60, Kendal and Taney. Gatell (1964 :36), Schreiber(1963: 196) 
11  Gatell (1964 : 51) characterizes the Girard Bank as an opponent, but Hammond characterizes Bank of America as the only opposition bank. 
Other authors as well as contemporary evidence, follow Hammond’s characterization 
12  Exchange between Taney and Niles on October 1833. Gatell (1964: 36)  
13 The one exception was the Union Bank of Maryland who only received a $300,000 draft (Hammond, 1951: 421) (Catterall : 302).  These 
drafts were massive compared to the total amount of federal funds in the state banks at the end of 1833.  In the last quarter of 1833, the State 
Banks had around 34 thousand of the Federal Deposits while the SBUS had 9 million. Sen. Doc. 16, Statement A (23rd Cong., 1st Sess.) 
14 Redlich (1951 : ch II. 177)  and Hammond(1951 : 420) have slightly different interpretation for why They eventually gave the banks more 
drafts despite their disobedience. Like Redlich, Hammond notes that the recklessness of the pet banks actions would have been an embarrassment 
to Taney, but in Hammond’s description, Taney later decided that it they might as well ‘destroy’ the bank by drawing down the SBUS funds with 
new drafts. 
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of the pet banks.15 However, after suddenly receiving drafts for amounts of up to $500,000 at a time, Biddle angrily 
reacted by severely contracting lending, resulting in a recession known as “Biddle’s Contraction”.16 The financial 
pressure on the business community galvanized support for the pet banks in Congress. These same members 
eventually endorsed removal of the deposits and sanctioned the use of state depositories. As hopes of obtaining a 
new charter for a national bank grew slim, the pet banking experiment became a more permanent part of the 
Jacksonian administration and attributing economic prosperity to the success of the pet banking system became an 
important part of Jacksonian Democratic rhetoric.17 
 
Selecting additional pet banks: 1833 to June 1836 
From January 1834 to June 1836 the deposit banking system gradually grew from seven banks to thirty 
five.18 The importance of politics in the selection of the additional deposit banks after the original seven has been the 
subject of significant debate.19 However, it is readily apparent that both Taney and his predecessor chose the next 
pet banks based on political and personal connections, in addition to the financial stability of the banks. They both 
realized the importance of developing a system that was stable in the face of financial uncertainties and political 
opposition. Thus the chosen banks had to be able to provide financial stability in addition to political spoils. Taney’s 
selection of the initial seven pet banks, especially the Bank of America, demonstrated this. All seven of these banks 
had some of the largest amounts of capital in their respective states and were generally very reputable banks, which 
helped solidify the foundation for the system. The selections by Taney’s successor, Levi Woodbury, similarly 
reflected a focus on creating a system that balanced stability and serving the interests of the administration. 
However, as the selections expanded, political favoritism and personal connections began to play a larger role 
(Gatell, 1964: 36). 
Many of the bank selections in the North confirmed critics’ perceptions that the selections prioritized 
political favoritism over financial security. Gatell (1964: 58) cites the Moyamensing Bank of Philadelphia, the 
Clinton Bank of Columbus, the Farmers and Mechanics Bank of Detroit and Mechanics and Farmers Bank of 
Albany as examples of banks that had strong Democratic ties but were weak in terms of capital. In particular, the 
Mechanics and Farmers Bank of Albany, which was known as the “Regency Bank”, served the interest of the New 
York Democratic party machine. Although its capital was only a fourth of the size of the average Wall Street pet 
bank, it received deposits through incessant lobbying. The selections in New England, were an even greater product 
of “pure politics, nepotism, or personal connections”: Secretary Woodbury’s father-in-law ran the Maine Bank of 
Portland; the Commercial Bank of New Hampshire had a Jacksonian President; the Bank of Burlington was close to 
                                                
15 , "The Secretary of the Treasury - The Kitchen Cabinet - And the Bank." New York Spectator , November 18, 1833. "The Bank of The United 
States--The Kitchen Cabinet." Philadelphia Inquirer, November 18, 1833. 
16 Meerman (1963:379), Catterall (1903:314-331). The secret drafts were an immediate action that set Biddle off but there were many other 
reasons for Biddle’s decision to contract lending. It is suggested that he was attempting to force congress to pass a new charter by causing 
economic distress.  
17 (McFaul, 1972: 70) 
18U.S. Treasury Reports in 1833 to 1837, corroborated by  (Schreiber 1963 : 197),  
19 Hammond (1957), Scheiber (1963), Gatell (1964), Taus (1943), Redlich (1951) 
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the administration; and John P. Van Ness, Democratic president of Bank of Metropolis, was a personal friend of 
Jackson’s  (Gatall, 1964: 60).  
There were anomalies, as Schreiber (1963) and Gattal (1964) have pointed out. The Treasury offered 
deposits to banks in South Carolina and Mississippi that had officers who were outspokenly anti-Jackson. The State 
Bank of North Carolina, the Bank of Louisville and the Bank of Michigan at Detroit all had boards that were 
controlled by Whigs.20 It is not particularly surprising that these banks were chosen despite their political 
persuasions. The Southern and Western states in particular relied more on the branches of the SBUS for banking, 
having established far fewer banks by the time of the selection.21 Michigan, Mississippi, Kentucky, Alabama, North 
Carolina, South Carolina and Virginia all had less than ten banks across the state in January 1836, whereas the New 
England and Mid Atlantic states had between twenty to one hundred banks per state.22  Selecting a depository in a 
state like Kentucky, where there were only three banks, meant choosing banks in the hands of the political 
opposition. In some cases, many of the banks in the South even declined to receive public deposits, but as Taney 
writes in an executive summary detailing the selections, several of them eventually “surrendered.”23  
 
Regulation of pet banks: 1833 to June 1836 
Around the time of the removal, Kendall advocated for a more centralized system that would replace some 
of the important roles of the SBUS.  By concentrating specie and making all paper redeemable in pet banks located 
in the financial centers of the Mid Atlantic region, he hoped to create a system that would replace the SBUS’s role in 
facilitating a more uniform national currency. Furthermore, these Banks would also would replace the SBUS in 
intermediating international payments, which required large amounts of specie for export. However, as the Secretary 
of the Treasury, Taney envisioned a more decentralized system for monetary stability that depended on strong 
interbank relationships and mutual redemptions between the pet banks.24 Levi Woodbury seemed to have settled on 
a design that incorporated elements from both.   
As Secretary of the Treasury, Woodbury kept the federal deposits heavily concentrated in the Wall Street 
pet banks (see Figure 1). As the financial capital of the country, New York City accumulated massive amounts of 
deposits through customs duties collected at its ports. These large deposit banks would in turn provide funds to a 
vast network of state banks which included other smaller pet banks.  In his 1835 Treasury Report, Woodbury 
expressed that his confidence in the pet banking system was based on their strong creditor relationship to other 
banks. However, Woodbury's confidence was misplaced, since credits held at correspondent banks proved to be 
relatively weak assets in the face of Panic when confidence in banking structure was lost (McFaul 1972: 160).  
                                                
20 Schreiber (1936:197) .Gatell(1964: 55) also identifies the Franklin Bank of Baltimore and the Bank of the State of North Carolina as 
opposition banks. 
21 Knodell (2006:550) measures the differences in banking services by region and finds that the Northwest and Southeast were more severely 
under banked, and were more adversely affected from the closing of the SBUS branches.  
22 Using Weber Bank Census Dataset, The number of operating banks on the 1 January 1836 
23 25th Congress 3rd session, Senate Document 302 , 1833 to 1834, Banks that Declined, Bank of South Carolina, Agricultural Bank Mississippi, 
Cape Fear Wilmington NC, State Bank, Planters and Mechanics Bank Charleston, Union Bank of South Carolina,  
24 McFaul (1972:61), Schiber (1963: 200) 
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It is traditionally believed that Woodbury was unable to regulate the pet banks without Congressional 
oversight. However, Schreiber (1963) and McFaul (1972) have shown, through exchanges between the Treasury and 
the pet banks, that Woodbury did attempt to enforce a conservative reserve ratio especially on the pet banks, which 
held large amounts of federal funds. 25 However, as autonomous state banks they made the decisions on how to 
manage the massive quantity of federal funds in their possession. Given the limited resources at Woodbury’s 
disposal, he could not feasible regulate all of them with the same effectiveness (McFaul 1972: 176).  
Despite the financial rationale behind Woodbury’s policies, the concentration of funds and the restrictions 
on lending at the New York banks renewed accusations that the administration was the servant of Wall Street 
interests. Furthermore, the restrictions to expand lending at the deposit banks brought criticisms from inflationists 
who argued that the federal deposits were being locked up in the Wall Street pet banks.  Growing resentment 
contributed to the political support for the Deposit Act of 1836. 26 
 
The Deposit Act of 1836 
In 1835, the rapid growth of the American economy combined with Jackson's opposition to many forms of 
federal spending enabled him to pay off the federal debt.27 Increasing land sales and customs duties from trade with 
Britain only increased the federal surplus that was accumulating in the vaults of the few pet banks where Woodbury 
concentrated federal deposits. Either resentment against “locking up” funds in the strictly held deposit banks or fear 
of overexpansion on the basis of the growing deposits led to enough support in Congress to pass the Deposit Act of 
1836 on June 23.28 The Act sought to “regulate the deposits of public money” and required the distribution of the 
federal surplus to the states in proportion with their population. In total, thirty seven million dollars was planned to 
be distributed in four equal installments as an interest-free loan starting in January 1837.29  The second part of the 
Act dealt with regulation of the deposit banks.  
The Deposit Act of 1836 was the first time Congress took an active role in regulating the deposit banks. 
The legislation required that the Treasury select at least one depository in each state “located at, adjacent to, or 
convenient to the points or places at which the revenue may be collected or disbursed.” It restricted the pet banks 
from issuing notes less than five dollars in denomination and ruled that any bank that suspended specie payments 
would be discontinued as a depository.30 Most importantly,  the Act stipulated that federal funds at deposit banks 
could not exceed three fourths of its paid-in capital. To keep in accordance with this rule, the number of pet banks 
grew from 36 to 81 over the course of six months.  
 
 
                                                
25 Timberlake (1960: 113) argued that despite Woodbury’s claims, the banks were practically unregulated in the lack of Congressional oversight, 
and were perhaps even in violation of state reserve requirements Schlesinger, 1946: 218) 
26 There are various Interpretations of the political origins of the Deposit Act, this analysis mostly draws from McFaul(1972: 165)  
27 Hammond (1957: 451) Expenditures remained fairly constant over 1833 to 1836, A majority of the federal government's income came from 
customs, but from 1834 to 1835 land sales can also increased from 4,900 to 14,800  
28 McFaul(1972: 113) , Trufant (1918), McGrane(1924), and Russell(1875) suggest that the deposit banks were overextending  
29U.S. Congress, Senate Doc No. 29, 24th Congress, 2d Session, p. 3,(1836), also Temin (1969:128), Schreiber (1963:202), Hammond 
(1957:453) 
30 Schreiber page 203, From U.S Statutes at large, V. 52, sec 1: Woodbury to D. Strong December 21, 1836, “Letters to banks correspondents” 
   
12 
The Supplemental Transfers of 1836 and the Distribution of the Surplus in 1837 
Because most of the surplus was concentrated in the deposit banks located in financial centers, Woodbury 
asked Congress if he could prepare for distribution by reallocating funds in a more equitable manner. Congress 
responded by amending the Act to give the Secretary of the Treasury the power to transfer funds in order to 
“produce a due equality, and just proportion, according to the provisions of said act.”31 Over the course of the six 
months between the enactment of the Deposit Act of 1836 and the first installment of the official distribution in 
1837, Woodbury ordered around thirty eight million dollars in “supplemental transfers.”  Twenty-six million of 
these transfers were completed by the end of 1836, and the rest in the early months of 1837. These transfers were 
thirty-five percent larger than those planned in the official distribution. Seventy percent of the transfers were ordered 
between banks in different states. Figure 2a summarizes the interstate transfers ordered from June 1836 to January 
1837. The funds were generally directed from West to East and North to South. Clearly, banks in New York and the 
Western states were drawn on for the greatest amounts of funds in interstate transfers, whereas banks in the 
Southeast, Mid-Atlantic, and New England states were net recipients. The chaotic pattern of transfers reflected the 
continued growth in the federal surplus that made Woodbury’s job increasingly difficult.  
In 1836, speculation in land had spiraled out of control. In response, Jackson issued an executive order 
known as the Specie Circular, which was intended to prevent the excessive land sales that he attributed to banks who 
were overextending credit through the issuance of paper money. Hard money Jacksonians who feared the excessive 
growth of paper money enthusiastically supported the measure. The circular went into effect on the 1st of August 
1836 and required federal land agencies to only accept specie in payment for public lands under 320 acres; by the 
1st of December, it applied to all land.32 Although the effectiveness of Jackson's policy at stopping the speculation is 
under debate, receipts from public land sales remained enormous and the accumulation of specie in the western 
deposit banks further complicated Woodbury’s efforts to equitably distribute the deposits.33  
Just as twenty-six million dollars in supplemental transfers was completed at the end of 1836, nine million 
dollars of the first installment of the official distribution of the surplus was ordered in January 1837.  Despite 
mounting pressures in the money market, Woodbury continued with the second installment on the April 1st. 
Compared to the transfers in 1836, only 32 percent of eighteen million dollars were in interstate transfers.34 As seen 
from Figure 2b there were far fewer interstate transfers and most were drawn out of New York. In May, before the 
third installment could take place, the Panic occurred and banks suspended payments; all but five of the ninety one 
deposit banks were stripped of their status under the regulations of the Deposit Act.35 The suspension essentially 
marked the end of the pet banking system. In August, Woodbury still carried out the third installment by placing 
drafts on the former deposit banks; however, these payments were in depreciated currency. The fourth installment 
                                                
31 U.S. Congress, Senate Doc No. 29, 24th Congress, 2d Session,  Rousseau (2002, 464),  Hammond (1957) 
32 Hammond (1957,445), McGrane (1924, 79), Rousseau (2002, 459) 
33 Smith, Walter Buckingham, and Arthur Harrison Cole. Fluctuations in American business 1790-1860. (1969). Table 2 Receipts from Sales of 
Public Lands, Quarterly 1816-1860,  
34 House Executive Document No. 30, 25th Congress 1st session, pp 72-81, Sept 1837 
35 25th Congress, 3rd Session S.Doc. 30 
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was eventually abandoned in the face of mounting federal debt; ultimately only 28 million dollars of the original 37 
million planned in the official distribution of the surplus was realized (Schreiber, 1963: 210). 
II.b. The Panic of 1837 
 
The Onset of the Panic 
The early stages of the Panic began on May 2nd, following the publication of a New York Herald 
investigation on a scandal at the Mechanics Bank, a major Wall Street pet bank. The bank’s president, John 
Fleming, had entered into a check kiting scheme with the Dry Dock Company Bank and the Wall Street brokerage 
firm Bullock, Lyman & Co.36 After pledging his Dry Dock Bank shares as collateral, Fleming agreed to let the 
brokerage firm draw checks against him and place them between the Dry Dock Bank and the Mechanics bank. 
Through their operation, Bullock, Lyman & Co. was able to procure a loan of $254,000. In April, when the price of 
the Dry Dock Bank stock lost half of its value, Fleming stopped extending credit to the firm. Following their failure 
in early April, the brokerage firm owed the Dry Dock Bank up to $141,000.  After the revelation of the scandal, 
Fleming, the cashier John Leonard and the vice president resigned under pressure from the board of directors.37 
Although the Mechanics Bank emphasized that the change of officers was not due to financial difficulties and 
ensured that Mr. Fleming would remain on the board of directors, his untimely death set off panic amongst note 
holders and depositors, and a run began that very day. Following the run on the Mechanics bank, attention shifted to 
the Dry Dock Company.  Rumors spread that New York City banks were refusing to accept Dry Dock notes and that 
they would not be able to sustain itself under financial pressure.  Predictably, this set off a run at the bank. Despite 
bank officers’ assurances that all Dry Dock bills would be redeemable at any bank, it did little to stop the drain of its 
specie.38 Unable to sustain the withdrawals, the bank requested an injunction to temporarily shut down. The Panic 
quickly spread to note holders of other banks, triggering a “general run” on all of the banks in New York City. The 
Commercial Advertiser estimates that six hundred thousand dollars of specie were withdrawn on the 8th and seven 
hundred thousand on the 9th. After a private meeting on the 10th of May, New York banks collectively decided to 
suspend specie payments.39 The next day, banks in Mobile, Philadelphia, Hartford, Baltimore, Providence and 
upstate New York suspended. As the news traveled, the suspensions continued: Boston, Maine, and Washington 
D.C. on the 12th, New Orleans on the 13th, Cincinnati on the 17th, and Charleston, North Carolina, and Indiana on 
the 18th.  Within a little over a week, most of the banks in the country had suspended payments.  
 
Resolution of the Panic 
Since banking was regulated by the states, the official response to the suspension fell to state legislatures. 
On the 16th of May, mere days after the Panic, the New York state legislature met and passed the Suspension Law, 
                                                
36 Check kiting is a type of fraud that involves taking advantage of the duplicate money in the banking system during delays in processing a 
check. The scheme often requires the use of accounts at several different banks so money can be moved between them. 
37 New York Herald May 2 1837 New York  
38 Commercial Advertiser May 8 1837 New York  
39 The Commercial Advertiser May 10 1837 New York.  
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authorizing the banks to suspend payments for the next year without risking charter revocation. Banks in turn were 
required to receive the notes of any other bank in payments due to itself. In addition, the law also limited bank 
circulation to a percentage of each bank’s capital; to ensure this, they were required to regularly report their 
condition to the bank commissioner. Other states passed similar laws legalizing the suspension for the next year or 
until the New York banks resumed operations.40 Given the disreputable nature of suspending specie payments, many 
states did not pass laws legalizing the suspension, and wrote back to the Treasury in June with the excuse that their 
state legislature had not been in session.41 For the next year, state legislatures commissioned the investigation of all 
banks in each state, with reports sent to the Treasury to be discussed at the House of Representatives in June 1838. 
The banks that were found to be insolvent were eventually forced into closure.  
Although New York's Suspension Law mandated resumption to occur in a year, New York bankers were 
eager to negotiate an earlier date. On the 19th of of August 1837, the New York banks sent an invitation to the banks 
of Philadelphia, beginning a long negotiation to coordinate a date of resumption. After months of stalling by banks 
in Philadelphia and a collective inability to reach a consensus, the frustrated New York bankers met on the 21st of 
April 1838, and announced that they would resume all specie payments on the 9th of May, much to the surprise of 
Philadelphia bankers.42  With the arrival of a £1,000,000 shipment of specie from the Bank of England in the spring 
of 1838 (which ignited the jealousy of Biddle, who had been attempting to receive loans from the Bank of England), 
the early resumption by New York banks went quite smoothly (Hammond, 1957: 480).  Banks in New England 
quickly followed suit, while the Philadelphia and Southern banks resumed in the Fall.  
 
Aftermath of the Panic 
Although data on the overall economic impact remains thin, the Panic of 1837 has been labeled by many as 
one of the worst panics in U.S. history.43 One author even dubbed it “America’s First Great Depression” (Alasdair, 
2012). Rousseau (2002: 457) presents statistics by George Evans which showed that non-financial business 
incorporations fell by 80 percent and that growth per capita investment fell from 6.6 percent per year between 1831-
1836 to 1 percent over the next five years.  Contemporary sources paint a picture of widespread unemployment and 
failure. “In the Fall of 1837, nine tenths of factories in eastern states were said to be closed” and “one fourth of all 
firms connected with mercantile and manufacturing interest are out of business with dreary prospects for the coming 
winter.” (Reznik 1935: 665). Despite the surmised downturn, the economy quickly recovered from the Panic as 
                                                
40 Other states include, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Virginia, Alabama, Illinois. , 25th Congress, 3rd Session S.Doc. 30 
41 Maine, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri reported to the treasury that 
they had passed no law. Suspension laws are found in 25th Congress, 2nd Session H.Doc. 13 Suspension of specie payment. Summary of the 
investigation is found in Senate Document no. 471. 25th Congress 2nd session June 7 1838 
42 After attempting to negotiate a resumption date several times, on the 26th of January the New Yorkers went to meet the Philadelphians who 
proposed to hold a convention on the 11th of April 1838 saying that the resumption date should incorporate the thoughts of everyone in the union. 
During the convention, a unanimous decision was not reached despite the New York bankers pressures for an early resumption. The 
Philadelphian bankers said that it was too premature to make a decision, prompting the New York Bankers to resume on their own.  Further 
details of the story are found in the New York Gazette and the Portsmouth Journal on Saturday May the 5th 1838 
43 “The Panic of 1837 was one of the most disastrous crises this nation has ever experienced” - McGrane (1924: 1) ;  “The financial panic that 
gripped the U.S. economy in the spring of 1837 was among the most severe in its’ history” - Rousseau (2002: 457) ;  “One of the most severe, if 
perhaps, not the worst, was the panic of 1837.” - CF. Warren, G.F Pearson, ( 1935: 239) ;  “The Panic of 1837, represents the greats economic 
downturn of the 19th century.“ - Alasdair (2012:37) ; “The Panic of 1837 was by far the most severe [panic] before the Civil War. “- Rockoff 
(2000: 666) ; “One of the worst of these panics in the United States was the Panic of 1837” - Weber et al.(2000:1) ; “ Between 1837 and 1843 
American society was passing through the deep hollow of a greater economic cycle “Rezner (1935: 662) 
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exemplified by what Wallis refers as the “double headed peak” in Smith and Cole's wholesale price index. 44 
Although the Panic of 1837 has been associated with causing the depression in the 1840s, the downturn came after 
the Panic of 1839, which Wallis(2001) has identified as a separate crisis due to collapse of internal improvement 
projects in the South and West following the massive increase in state borrowing after 1836.   
The Panic’s effect on politics was equally profound. It added fuel to the debate about the role of 
government in the regulation of banking, solidifying the differences between the Democrats and the newly 
formalized Whig party. Anti-bank hard money radicalism increased Democratic hostility towards banks, alienating 
Democratic bankers who supported Treasury regulation through the pet banking system.45 After divorcing 
themselves from banking, the Democrats devised an “Independent Treasury” that would serve as a federal 
depository but without any of the functions of a bank. The government's money would then remain safe in an 
institution that did not have the power to extend credit by issuing loans.  
At the state level, the Panic ushered in an era of free banking, where state governments transitioned from “a 
fairly ‘iron handed’ regime to a more invisible one”.46 State banks also began to impose restrictions on banking. 
Louisiana passed the Banking Law of 1838 that required banks to hold specie at a 1:3 ratio with notes and limited 
note issuance to a maximum of a fifth of the bank’s paid-in capital (Trufant, 1918: 11). In 1838, Massachusetts 
created a Board of Bank Commissioners to annually examine the condition of all the banks in the state. Ohio passed 
a similar law in 1839, requiring the regular reporting of balance sheets, and well as restrictions on note issuance 
relative to specie reserves (Ghandhi, 2003: 18-24). 
III. Literature Review: What caused the Panic of 1837? 
III.a. The Underlying Causes of the Panic  
 
“Inflation, crisis, deflation: This was the story of the Jacksonian Era” - Temin (1969: 176) 
 
The rapid rise in prices, land sales and capital flows in the years preceding the Panic has been the focus of 
much of the existing literature. The earliest works echoed Whig contemporaries and attributed the overexpansion of 
the money supply to the destruction of the Second Bank of the United States.47  After the deposits were removed and 
put into state banks, the growing federal surplus allowed the state banks to overextend their lending which resulted 
                                                
44 Wallis (2001:4)  borrows the term “double headed peak” from R.C.O Matthews.in the The Trade Cycle (1960). Smith and Cole (1935:158) 
Statistics on the inflation also presented in Rockoff(2000: 654) Figure 14.1:the price and ratio of money to real gross domestic product   
45  Scheiber(1963: 214), McFaul(1972: 210)  
46 Although Bodenhorn (2001: 233) attributes the move to free banking as being part of a long chain of events starting in the late 1810s, he does 
acknowledge that the Panic was important in that it galvanized the support of those where were displeased with the corruption of the Democratic 
Party Machine.  
47 Trufant(1918), Bourne (1857), Russell(1875), McGrane(1924), Catterall (1903), Meerman(1963) 
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in a “restless spirit of adventure and daring enterprise” that swept the nation (McGrane 1924: 91).48  The resulting 
speculative frenzy would eventually lead to the inflation and then Panic.  
In 1957, Bray Hammond further popularized the inflationary effects of the Bank War. Depicting the Bank 
War as a struggle between well established capitalists and new entrepreneurs, Hammond saw the destruction of the 
Second Bank of the United States as removing the only restraint preventing overexpansion of credit at the state 
chartered banks. As a federal depository, the SBUS accumulated large amounts of state bank notes that it could 
rapidly redeem in large quantities at the issuing bank. This in turn required state banks to keep adequate reserves in 
case of a rash of sudden large withdrawals. By moderating the speed with which they redeemed state banks notes, 
the Bank could apply an informal reserve ratio requirement. Under the assumption that state banks were eager to 
expand beyond their means, the destruction of the only monitor over the state banks enabled the period of 
speculative growth.  
This was the conventional wisdom until Peter Temin challenged Hammond’s analysis. Using the Friedman-
Schwartz framework to decompose the estimates of the money stock into its basic components, Temin first pointed 
out the simple fact that the reserve ratio of the banking system did not fall below its level in the 1830s, like it should 
have if the destruction of the Second Bank unleashed reckless banking. Rather than lowering their reserve ratios, 
banks were able to expand because the overall level of specie reserves was increasing. Through the analysis of each 
link in a causal chain, Temin identifies Mexico as the main source of the specie and finds that it was retained due to 
changes in the ability of the U.S. to use bills of exchange drawn on English merchants when trading with China after 
the Opium War. Temin then realizes that all else equal the inflation should have corrected itself as individuals chose 
cheaper foreign goods over more expensive American ones, which would lead to an outflow of specie. However, it 
did not because capital flows from British investments in American assets underwrote a trade deficit which resulted 
in the continued retention of the specie in the U.S. Building off of Temin’s work, Williams (2016: 3) identifies 
another source of the accumulation of specie in the nation’s banks.  Starting with expansion of British joint stock 
banking acts of 1826, Williams traces the explosive growth in the flow of short term lending into the US by focusing 
on the major trade artery linking cotton production in the South to the Lancaster region of the UK. Together the 
“capital flow bonanza”, and the retention of silver from Mexico, would increase the money supply and cause the 
inflation.49 
There is general consensus behind Temin's identification of the source of the inflation. However, some 
remain skeptical of his exoneration of Jackson's Bank War. Engerman (1970: 726) finds that the removal of the 
SBUS resulted in a loss of confidence in state banks, which increased the currency-deposit ratio leading to a decline 
in the money supply.  Accounting for the “investment club” nature of commercial banking at the time, Knodell 
(2006: 557) identifies 45 to 52 percent of observed growth in bank credit in the Southwest and 26 to 46 percent in 
Northwest as stemming from excessive credit growth that accompanied the removal of the Second Bank. 
Furthermore, she notes that the replacement of the relatively conservative Second Bank branches with new 
plantation and property banks, which financed long term debt in land and state infrastructure, also increased the 
                                                
48
 Trufant: the surplus revenue, . Trufant argument slightly different, but mechanism is the same. Role of SUBUS different Removal of the deposits 
into the pet banks, and the surplus that was distributed.  who lent money to speculators  
49 “Capital flow bonanza” is from Williams (2016 : 1, 8, 18) who is quoting Reinhart and Rogoff (2009 : 157) 
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overall level of risk in the banking system. Regardless of the Bank War’s true effects, the rapid price inflation was 
readily apparent, and it resulted in the monetary pressure leading up the Panic. 
III.b. Proximate Causes of the Panic  
There are two general schools of thought regarding the triggers of the Panic. The first, held by most of the 
early historians and revived by Rousseau (2002), focuses on some combination of domestic factors such the Specie 
Circular, the supplemental transfers in 1836, and the distribution of the surplus in 1837. The second, which is held 
by Temin (1969), focuses on international factors such as increases in the Bank of England’s discount rate and the 
tightening of its lending policies.  The earliest work actually emphasized both international and domestic forces, but 
as the use of quantitative techniques increased, arguments became sharper and ideas evolved to become increasingly 
divergent.  
The ‘Traditionalists’ (1837 - 1957)50 - Limited by the availability of data and computing power, the earliest 
literature on the Panic provided more of a detailed narrative of events, with evidence in the form of written 
exchanges amongst important figures and contemporary news reports. While they differ in some nuanced ways, a 
majority of the earliest theories have emphasized the distribution of the surplus and the Specie Circular as having 
triggered the Panic. Without giving much detail on the direction or amount transferred in 1836 and 1837, the 
Traditionalist authors have argued that the distribution of the surplus caused the movement of specie “in opposition 
to the normal course of trade”, and that it locked up funds in transit.51 The Specie Circular, which had taken effect 
around the same time, exacerbated the problem further by draining specie from the East to be used to pay for land 
purchases in the West.52 The inadequate movement of specie to support the growing land sales burst the land bubble, 
causing the price of land to drop significantly.53 While early scholars have stressed Jacksonian policy, many also 
acknowledged the specie calls from English creditors as playing an important role in contributing to the tipping 
point in New York.54 Hammond even thought, “Although the Specie Circular and the Distribution were important 
domestic disturbances, they were minor besides other evils produced by the speculation and hasty expansion in the 
transatlantic economy comprising Britain and America” (1957: 457). 
Timberlake (1960) - Responding to the work of the Traditionalists, Timberlake finds that that the Specie 
Circular had a negligible effect on the economy due to the relatively small size in the reduction of land sales relative 
to GNP. Instead, he points to the official distribution of the surplus in 1837, but distinguishes his argument by 
specifying that the reason the transfers were so harmful was not because funds were “locked up” in transit. Instead, 
it was because substantial amounts of specie were drained from the New York City banks in the interstate portion of 
the transfers. Timberlake begins by deducing that the government could not have required that all transfers be in 
                                                
50 Bourne (1885), Russell (1896), Trufant (1918), Benton (1854-56),  Hammond (1957), McGrane (1924), Woofter (1940), Conway (1939), 
Catterall (1903) 
51  The specific traditionalists are  Bourne (1885) , Sumner (1899: 280),  Hammond (1957: 456).  
The quote “in the opposition to the normal course of trade” comes from Timberlake(1960:111) who is quoting Bourne (1885) 
52Bourne (1885: 35), McGrane (1924: 92).  Rousseau (2002: 460) mentions this in his background. Temin (1969: 121)  also discusses the 
traditionalists theories on the Specie Circular.  
53 Rousseau (2002: 465) references Traditionalists argument that the flow of specie to the west was inadequate to support pace causing a break in 
land prices ushering the panic. Also mentioned in Bourne (1885) and Bancroft (1914) 
54 Woofter (1940, 4)  Conway (1939, 13) Hammond (1957) 
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specie given the fact that the whole banking system had only 40.2 million total in specie and the deposit banks only 
had 15.52 million (Timberlake, 1960:113). He then posits that only the interstate transfers must have been in specie 
because state depositories and deposit banks within the same state cooperate to ease the facilitation of payments. To 
bolsters his argument, Timberlake shows that the total amount of specie at deposit banks fell by 4.94 million from 
November 1, 1836 to August 15, 1837, which coinciding with the 5.58 million needed for the interstate portion of all 
four of the installments of the distribution. Since only the first two installments could take place before the Panic, 
Timberlake then highlights the 2.9 million of the 18 million in interstate transfers that were actually distributions in 
the first two installments, noting that the 1.431 million that was drawn on New York City deposit banks was 
disportionately heavy.  Despite the relatively small amount of specie being drawn, Timberlake concludes that the 
distribution resulted in a “seven fold contraction of bank credit” because of the fractional reserve basis on which the 
banks operated (Timberlake, 1960 :115). 
Schreiber (1963) - Although he devotes much of his analysis to the pet banking system, Schreiber (1963) 
also responds directly to Timberlake's arguments. He first calls for the further investigation of the claim that the 
Specie Circular had a negligible effect, arguing that although it did not reduce aggregate demand, it did cause a net 
increase in demand for specie in the West. This would naturally have had a significant effect on state banks, who 
would be called on to provide the specie. He provides evidence of correspondence between banks and the Treasury, 
documenting the movement of large amounts of specie from New York banks to Western banks.55 Schreiber also 
questions Timberlake's assumption that only the interstate transfers were in specie, finding evidence that transfers to 
both “neighboring and distant institutions alike often had to be paid in specie rather than in bank credits or paper.”56 
Additionally, he points out that Timberlake failed to discuss the supplemental transfers of 1836, which were 
significantly larger than the ones in 1837 and involved a higher number of interregional transfers. Schreiber 
concludes that the total amount of transfers carried out “dealt a severe blow” to banks who were also experiencing 
an asset freeze as bills of exchange became uncollectable due to the decline in prices (Scheiber 1963: 209). 
Temin (1969) - Although Temin acknowledges that the Specie Circular and the distribution of the surplus 
may have contributed to the crisis, he is unconvinced by the previous literature. Temin first disputes the claim that 
the Specie Circular caused the movement of specie from East to West on the grounds that: 1) there is a lack of 
banking statistics to support this fact and 2)  the reserve ratio of banks in the West should have risen relative to the 
ones in the East, but only the reserve ratios of the banks in the Northwest rose by any significant amount.57 
Furthermore, he observes that even if specie had accumulated from land sales, the Western banks could have gotten 
the specie without taking it from the Eastern banks since the total amount of specie in the country was rising. To 
counter the distribution of the surplus, Temin adopts Timberlake's assumption that the interstate transfers were in 
specie and concludes that the 2.9 million in interstate transfers was too small to have caused the Panic. He further 
diminishes the effects of the official distribution by suggesting that the interstate transfers were likely to not have 
                                                
55 Scheiber (1963: 206) “Letters from Banks” Treasury Correspondence. Bank of Michigan reported that they brought $500,000 in coin from 
New York. The Commercial Bank of Cincinnati imported more than $300,000 in specie from June to October, and then another $150,000 in mid 
October.  
56 Schreiber (1963: 207) Footnote 46,  Correspondence from James Hall to Woodbury on October 15 in the “letters from banks Treasury 
correspondence” and T.P Handy to J.Woodbridge on September 1 1836 in the Commercial Bank of Lake Erie Papers. 
57 Temin (1969: 122) Main evidence in Table 3.4 ; Temin (1969: 75)  Reserve Ratios of State Banks by Region 1834-37  
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been in specie. Noticing that transfers were through large commercial cities to outlying districts, Temin suggests the 
transfers were probably paid in drafts on those large commercial cities since “drafts on the cities were more 
desireable than specie (before May 10).” 58   
In response to the supplemental transfers in 1836, Temin uses Woodbury's summary address to Congress to 
first note that these transfers were not actually to geographically relocate funds in preparation, but were actually due 
to the provision in the Deposit Act of 1836 that required banks to only hold deposits amounting to three fourths of 
their paid-in capital. Despite acknowledging that these supplemental transfers were fairly large and placed strain on 
the banking system, Temin points out the fact that large government transfers were quite common. From June 1835 
to April 1836 the Treasury also transferred around 18 million in government deposits. Although these were only half 
the size as those in 1836, when measured relative to the total amount of federal deposits at the time, they appear 
similar in size (Temin 1969: 135).  After rejecting the Specie Circular and the distribution of the surplus as triggers 
of the Panic, Temin finds an explanation elsewhere. 
According to Temin, the Panic came in two stages. First, in the summer of 1836, the Bank of England 
raised its discount rate and imposed restrictions on the availability of credit by instructing its Liverpool branch to 
reject bills drawn on houses involved in American trade. The scarcity of credit was reflected in the rise in the 
discount rate on commercial paper and the price of foreign exchange in late 1836. The rate was maintained until the 
second stage, when the resulting financial pressure and changes in the foreign demand for cotton caused a drop in its 
price in early 1837. As a result, debts secured on cotton became uncollectable and banks found their assets to be 
either worthless or highly illiquid, thus forcing them to suspend payments (Temin, 1969: 141).  
The primary evidence Temin uses to construct the timeline of events is summarized in Figure 3.  After the 
Bank of England raised its discount rate in late 1836, credit became scarce and the discount rate on commercial 
paper increased at rate of around 2 percent per month, reaching a peak of 30 percent in October 1836. Since the 
market for foreign exchange was the major channel through which changes in Britain could influence the United 
States, Temin (1969:145) also notes that the price of foreign exchange also began to rise, reaching a peak in the 
second quarter of 1837.  To explain why the discount rate would rise in late 1836 and be “maintained for about six 
months” until the crisis, Temin notes that in the second quarter of 1837 the price of cotton dropped severely which 
resulted in the second spike in the discount rate as well more firm failures (Temin 1969: 146).  
Temin documents the widespread firm failures, beginning with the New Orleans cotton factor Herman 
Briggs & Co59 A week after hearing news of the Herman failure, one of their major creditors, J.L  & S Joseph & Co. 
of New York,  also had to close its doors in early March 1837.  The Josephs were a particularly reputable bill 
brokerage firm in New York, and their failure is cited by Temin as the beginning of the Panic.60  As the pressure 
continued the number of firm failures increased.   On April 8 the Journal of Commerce reported 93 failures in New 
York. A week later and the New York Courier and Enquirer reported that ten to twelve first rate houses, and forty to 
                                                
58 Temin (1969: 132) also quotes Biddle who wrote in a letter to John Q. Adams saying “there Is no individual and no state in the union that 
would not prefer payments in New York or the North Atlantic cities, to payments elsewhere; and for the obvious reason that money is worth more 
than else where”, Original source:  Biddle letter to John Q. Adams on November 11, 1836.  
59 Lepler (2013, 109) also attributes the pressure to change from the Bank of England, and attributes the Herman failure as the start of the Panic. 
An in depth exploration of the Hermann failure is presented in pages 109 -111 
60 Rockoff (2014: 17) and Lepler also consider the failure of those firms as the beginning of the Panic 
   
20 
fifty second rate houses in New Orleans had failed. To further bolster his argument that the Panic was the result of 
international forces, Temin highlights that the types of firms that failed were more exposed to “changes in 
international affairs” and were located in the principal markets for cotton. Furthermore, he claims that the 
suspension in New Orleans was independent of the suspension in New York given the time it took for news to 
travel. Since the In doing this, he establishes that the Panic also began in the two principal markets for cotton. Given 
the financial pressure, firm failures, and suspensions in both New Orleans and New York, Temin concludes that the 
crisis must have originated in international affairs and was transmitted through the price of cotton (Temin 1969: 
144). 
Rousseau (2002) - Although Rousseau acknowledges the disturbances that stemmed from the actions of the 
Bank of England, he argues that these events only played a secondary role in the Panic. He challenges Temin, 
noting: 1) there was an eight month gap between the Bank of England's actions and the Panic; 2) the fall in the price 
of cotton came after the annual export cycle; and 3) the Bank of England’s rejection of U.S bills was quickly 
reversed.61  Having also rejected Timberlake’s theory on the grounds that the interstate transfers were too small to 
have had a significant effect, Rousseau found the cause of the Panic elsewhere.  
Revisiting the domestic disturbances touched upon by Schreiber (1964), Rousseau makes the argument that 
the interstate portion of the supplemental transfers in 1836 in conjunction with the Specie Circular drained the 
reserves of the New York City deposit banks, precipitating the Panic. From the 1st of September 1836 to the 1st of 
May 1837, the specie reserve of New York deposit banks fell from from 7.2 million to 1.5 million, leaving them 
vulnerable to sudden demands for specie by the British. Noting that the unit banking system was particularly fragile, 
the drain of specie could have easily caused widespread runs.  
To make the argument that the interstate transfers were actually in specie and that they did cause a drain 
from the New York banks, Rousseau (2002) analyzes the monthly balance sheet items for deposit banks and 
Congressional documentation of individual transfers aggregated by region. He shows that the interstate transfers in 
1836 followed a particular geographic pattern that followed existing transportation networks, claiming that such a 
pattern would not have been observed if Woodbury intended the transfers to only involve bookkeeping or paper 
transactions (Rousseau 2002: 472). As further evidence that the transfers involved specie, he also showed that the 
New York pet banks lost 4.4 million of specie around the same time that they lost 5.3 million of their deposits 
between August to March 1837 (Rousseau 2002: 468). If all of the interstate transfers were in specie, then large 
amounts of interstate transfers drawn from the New York banks would explain the reduction in their reserves.  
The second part of Rousseau’s argument emphasizes the Specie Circular. In the past, the main problem in 
implicating the Specie Circular has been that there has been poor evidence of the alleged drain of specie from the 
East to West. To address that, Rousseau uses Woodbury’s records of deposits made in pet banks made by federal 
receivers.   
                                                
61  Rousseau (2002: 486) does acknowledges that the rejection of commercial bills from the American Houses could have caused uncertainty in 
the U.S money market when the news was accidentally leaked to one of the American Houses (Wiggins & Co.) three weeks before the rejections 
were to begin. However, the Bank of England's actions were severely criticized by the British financial community, which led to a quick reversal 
of the policy.  There was only a two week window between news of the rejection and the reversal. 
An in-depth discussion of the BOE’s policies are found in Lepler (2013; 97), Hammond (1957: 457)  
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Since Woodbury’s summary displayed the composition of the deposits, Rousseau was able to determine 
how much was paid in gold and estimates that around 8.4 million dollars of the of land sales between July 1836 to 
May 1837 were in specie.  Although the summary only showed land sales after the Circular began, Rousseau makes 
the assumption that specie was seldom used before to emphasize that the amount of land paid for in gold increased 
significantly after the Circular. To further highlight the specie drain, he elaborates on the strange pattern in the 
monthly data for Michigan, which saw its deposits by land office receivers fall from 0.75 million in August to 0.09 
million and then rise back to 0.29 million in October.  Because Michigan was fairly isolated, importing specie was 
more difficult, resulting in a delay in the flow of specie that severely inhibited land sales. But once they received 
specie, land sales would rapidly continue, which explains the jump from 0.09 to 0.29 million. To show that the 
specie was being drained specifically out of the New York banks, he explains that gold was used in the majority of 
the transactions in Michigan as a less costly alternative to silver. Gold was also commonly used for international 
transactions, and accumulation in New York which was the financial capital at the time. Therefore, he concludes 
that the gold being sent to supply Michigan was most likely from New York.     
Today there is a general consensus that both international and domestic factors played a role in 
precipitating the Panic. Sylla (2001), Wallis (2001) and Williams (2016) find both Temin and Rousseau’s evidence 
to be compelling but remain impartial as to which had a greater effect.62  Despite all the insightful contributions 
towards identifying economic disturbances leading up to the Panic, there is still room for better understanding what 
was most impactful in triggering it. Most of the evidence documents regional patterns, which has made it difficult to 
rule out any of the theories. Additionally, the evidence relating to transfers focuses more on determining the 
substance, size, and movement of funds rather than quantifying the direct impact on banks. Although 
Rousseau(2001) and Timberlake(1960) present balance sheets, they are regionally aggregated and only include 
deposit banks.   
IV.  Hypotheses, Data and the Empirical Strategy 
                   To test the various theories, I utilize individual bank balance sheets and banknote discounts to examine 
which variables are correlated with more adverse effects on a bank’s assets, liabilities, and quoted banknote discount 
after the Panic. Variables of interest include: the total amount of interstate and intrastate transfers from each bank in 
1836 and 1837, whether or not they are a deposit bank, their centrality in the network, and their amount on deposit 
in New York. Each theory predicts distinct outcomes for particular variables. In this section I outline those 
hypotheses.  
IV.a. Hypothesis for each Theory  
The earliest literature on the Panic were works by Benton (1856), Bourne (1885), Russell (1896), Bancroft 
(1914), Trufant (1918), McGrane (1924), who collectively make the argument that the Specie Circular and 1837 
                                                
62 Williams (2016, 7)  “Wallis finds both arguments compelling and concludes both the Bank of England's actions and the U.S government 
policies played a role. This view strikes me as correct.“  
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transfers drained specie from the East to the West. Without distinguishing between the interstate and intrastate 
transfers, they also argue that transfers caused a large amount of specie to get “locked up in transit” (Bourne 1885), 
causing a liquidity crisis.  The Panic could have arisen when depositors feared that banks that were heavily drawn in 
both intrastate and interstate transfers in 1836 and 1837 were illiquid. Therefore, a greater amount drawn from the 
bank in the intrastate and interstate transfers in 1836 and 1837 should be correlated with less deposits, and 
circulation. Depending on the banks’ conservatism and the amount of liabilities they lost, we would also expect a 
greater decrease in lending.  
Timberlake (1960), Schreiber (1963) and Rousseau (2002) make similar arguments about liquidity, except 
they differ on which parts of the 1836-37 transfers they consider to be more impactful. Timberlake claims that only 
the interstate portion of the transfers in 1837 were in specie, and therefore a greater amount drawn from the bank in 
the 1837 transfers should be correlated with less deposits, circulation, and specie. There should be little effect 
associated the interstate transfers. Rousseau, on the other hand, claims the interstate transfers in 1837 were too small 
and that instead the Panic was caused by the interstate transfers in 1836. Therefore, a greater amount drawn from the 
bank in the interstate transfers in 1836 should result in a greater decrease in deposits, circulation, and specie, with all 
other transfers (1836 intra 1837 inter and intra) having negligible effect. Schreiber (1963: 936) in turn suggests that 
both the interstate and intrastate transfers in 1836 and 1837 were in specie but that the transfers in 1836 were larger 
and had a greater impact than those in 1837. Therefore, both the intrastate and interstate transfers in 1836 should be 
associated with a greater decrease in deposits, circulation, and specie. Furthermore, the magnitude of effect should 
be larger for 1836 than 1837. Both Timberlake and Rousseau’s theories agree that the transfers had the greatest 
impact on banks in New York, and therefore the magnitude of the respective expected results should be greater for 
those banks. 
 Importantly, for all theories regarding the transfers, we not only expect banks that paid out more in the 
transfers do worse, but among deposit banks, those that paid greater amounts in the transfers should have done 
worse. Therefore, we should observe adverse effects from the transfers holding constant deposit bank status. 
Furthermore, deposit bank status should not be correlated with statistically significant changes if the only impact on 
deposit banks was through the transfers.    
 Finally, all these authors suggest that the Panic was triggered by a liquidity crisis. In the random-
withdrawal (RW) theory proposed by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), panics are caused by illiquidity and are driven 
by the self-fulfilling beliefs of depositors. They can spread when problems with liquidity in one region pull reserves 
away from another, or when correspondent banks/depositors in other regions become concerned that they cannot 
access their deposits.63  In the event of a liquidity crisis, we would expect the banks that are more central in the 
interbank payment network to do worse because more banks are reliant on them for liquidity. So they may face 
greater runs from correspondent banks causing depositors to fear the bank will become illiquid. Therefore, banks 
with that were more central in the interbank payments network should see less circulation, deposits, and lending. 
Furthermore, if the Panic spread due to problems with liquidity in New York then banks which held more deposits 
in New York should have seen greater decreases in circulation and deposits. In the RW theory we would expect to 
                                                
63 Carlson (2005: 2) Calomiris and Gorton (1991: 109), Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007) 
   
23 
see less firm failures, unless the shock to liquidity was so severe that banks were forced to sell their assets at firesale 
prices.64 In those cases, firm failures should be concentrated in the places that experienced the greatest shock to 
liquidity. That would be New York given Rousseau and Timberlake's argument, and other Eastern cities given 
Rousseau and the Traditionalist’s argument that the Specie Circular drained specie from the East. 
Temin’s (1969) theory contrasts the others’ by emphasizing an asset shock instead of problems with 
liquidity. He argued that, 1) the intrastate transfers in 1836 and 1837 required no specie, 2) the interstate transfers in 
1837 were too small and those drawn on New York would have been as drafts on city banks instead of specie, 3) the 
supplemental transfers in 1836 were not that impactful. Taken in conjunction, this indicates that the both the 
interstate and intrastate transfers in 1836 and 1837 should not be associated with changes in deposits, circulation, 
and lending. Instead he emphasizes an asset shock from a fall in the price of cotton, which came at the height of a 
credit contraction that arose from changes in British lending. Therefore, banks in the states located in ‘Cotton South’ 
should have seen a greater decrease in lending, and a greater increase their bank note discount. Williams (2016: 13), 
shows that Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama saw the greatest growth in the level of specie and lending per capita 
in 1836 from increases in cotton exports to the Lancashire region of the United Kingdom. Therefore, the effects 
should be particularly worse in those states.  
Asset depreciation is also consistent with the asymmetric information (AI) theory of banking panics, which 
was elaborated by Calomiris and Gorton (1991).65 In the AI theory, panics are caused by real shocks where 
depositors receive information that leads them to revise their assessment of the riskiness of banks. However due to 
information asymmetries, they are unable to identify which banks are insolvent and run on all banks.  Banks suspend 
convertibility, to sort out which banks are insolvent. In the AI theory, failures occur from the depreciation of a 
bank’s assets. Therefore, the banks in regions with a larger amount of assets tied to the price of cotton should have 
had a higher concentration of bank failures. Given the severity of the decline, we would also expect the overall 
number of bank failures to be higher. 66 
Although the Traditionalists emphasized that the Panic was caused by a liquidity crisis, they also suggest a 
real shock that resulted in asset deprecation which would also be consistent with AI theory. They note that after the 
Specie Circular required public land sales to be paid for in specie, Eastern banks were called to support the land 
sales. However, the flow of specie into the West was insufficient to support the pace of land sales, resulting in a 
break in the price of land. 67  A panic from the decline in the price of land could also be consistent with the AI 
theory. Therefore, the banks in the frontier states, which had a larger amount of assets tied to the price of land, 
should have had a higher concentration of bank failures, as well as a greater decrease in lending and a greater 
increase in bank note discount. These effects should also be greater for Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Southern 
frontier states, since they had the greatest amounts of land sales, as seen in Figure 4. Within the southern frontier 
states the effects should be particularly acute for Alabama and Mississippi, which had roughly two million in sales 
                                                
64 There is evidence that the details of the transfers were fairly public knowledge and were published in various newspapers. New York Herald 
reported on 14 October and 9th of September 1836  
65 Calomiris and Gorton (1991:115), Calomiris (1989a), Chari and Jagannathan (1988), Gorton (1987), Jacklin  Bhattacharya (1988)  
66 Failure rates can also be high in the random withdrawal theory. If banks experiencing extreme enough problems with liquidity might have to 
sell assets at firesale prices. Calomiris and Gorton (1991:110), 
67 Rousseau (2002: 460) talks about the traditionalists who make this claim. Bancroft (1914) 
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in 1837, and Louisiana which had around one million in sales in 1837 (Smith and Cole, 1935: 57,58). Finally, the AI 
theory suggests that panics spread when there failures or suspensions in one region signal information about the 
solvency of banks in other parts of the country. Thus being highly connected in the interbank payments system 
should not be associated with worse outcomes if the panic was due to an asset shock.  
 
The “Pet Banking Theory” 
In the vein of works that emphasize domestic forces, I explore the possibility that the Panic was driven by a 
loss of confidence in the Democratic pet banking system. Rousseau (2001), Timberlake (1960), and Schreiber 
(1963) have highlighted the deposit bank system as having caused the Panic, but they emphasize the transfers as the 
mechanism behind the collapse. Instead, I hypothesize that the Panic arose when depositors became uncertain about 
the stability of the pet banks after perceiving changes in the political support for the system as a whole.   
Most of the recent scholarship has focused on trying to understand the Panic in a way that is not colored by the 
political biases that were common in the works of traditionalists.  However, politics and banking were intimately 
tied; political forces could certainly have contributed to a banking panic.  
The pet banking system was a classic example of systemic corruption as described by Wallis (2004).  In 
such a system, political agents generate economic rents by limiting entry and privileges to a select few. Rents tie the 
interests of beneficiaries to those of politicians who in turn receive shares of those rents to protect the monopoly.  In 
essence, “political interests corrupted the economic system for political gains” (Wallis, 2004:2). The pet banking 
system quickly grew into a well-established institution under the political support of the pro-banking Democrats, 
who were its main beneficiaries. The chosen pet banks had access to extraordinary amounts of funds that would not 
have been available otherwise. On average, the federal deposits comprised 39 percent of a pet bank's liabilities, but 
for some banks it was as high as 80 percent.68 This would have allowed them to extend more credit (Gatell, 1964: 
36). In turn the local Democratic organizations allied themselves with Jackson’s administration. Attributing 
economic prosperity to the success of the pet banking system became an important part of the Jacksonian 
Democratic rhetoric. To the pet bank’s supporters, the banks were referred to as the “Executive League of Banks” 
and were considered to be an improved versions of the National Bank “under the patronage of Amos Kendall, 
Whitney, and President Jackson.”   
Although the pet banking experiment proved to be a powerful tool for Democratic Republicans, by 1836, 
factions within the party as well as growing dissatisfaction with corruption began to intensify.  The anti-banking 
hard-money faction of the Democratic party had long tolerated the pet banking system; however, with the Panic 
came a shift in mindset. The accumulation of the surplus in 1836 incited fear in both the anti-bank Jacksonians and 
opposition Whigs alike. In mid-1836, the federal surplus of $40,000,000 was sitting in the vaults of thirty-five pet 
banks (Hammond, 1957:452). With the Deposit Act, which was passed in reaction, Woodbury was forced to 
dramatically expand the pet bank selections. Although he similarly prioritized political friends, the pet banking 
system soon became highly decentralized. The official distribution only furthered that process. At the same time, the 
                                                
68 United States. Department of the Treasury. Annual Report 1830-1840  
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Specie Circular signified the Jacksonians movement towards a more hard-money stance. The political clout and the 
special privileges the pet banking system once had began to disappear (McFaul, 1972:176).  
By May, the financial pressure intensified and revealed fraud at two of the most important New York pet 
banks, the Mechanics and Dry Dock Bank. The discovery of blatant misconduct at the supposedly safe government 
repositories spread fears they were overleveraged. Importantly, it marked the end of the pet bank’s special status in 
the banking system and made it no longer possible for the Jacksonians to support them. Questions of the financial 
health of the pet banks and a loss of their special status led to withdrawals that could have certainly lead to Panic. 
Given this theory, we would expect deposit banks to have faced greater runs and therefore have less 
deposits, circulation and specie after the Panic, as well as a larger banknote discount and higher probability of 
failure. These effects should also be greater for deposit banks located in North, where the political and personal 
connections between banks and the administration was stronger.  
To distinguish from Rousseau (2001), Timberlake (1960), and Schreiber’s (1963) theories, the described 
differences for deposit banks should be observed while holding constant the amount of transfers. Additionally, we 
should not observe large effects for transfers. Although the transfers were important because they signified declining 
support for the deposit banks, the exact magnitude of the transfers paid by each bank should not matter. 
Furthermore, to distinguish that the Panic was not due to problems with the liquidity of pet banks, we should not 
observe deposit banks that were more central in the interbank payments network to have less deposits, circulation 
and specie after the Panic. In New York, where I am able to observe banks’ political affiliations, we should also 
expect the Democrat-affiliated deposit banks to have less deposits, circulation and specie after the Panic compared 
to the deposit banks that were part of the political opposition.  
 
Table 1: Summary of hypothesized outcomes for each theory. 
Theory Variable Expected Outcomes 
Traditionalists 
Schreiber (1963) 
Interstate and Intrastate Transfers in 
1837 and 1836 
Loans and Discounts (-), Specie (-), Circulation (-), 
Deposits (-), Banknote Discount (+) 
 
Traditionalists 
States with most land sales.  
MI, IN, IL, LA, AL, MS 
Banknote Discount (+), 
 Higher Number of Failures 
Timberlake (1960) Interstate Transfers in 1837, Network 
Centrality, Log Deposits in New York 
Loans and Discounts (-), Specie (-), Circulation (-), 
Deposits (-), Banknote Discount (+) 
Temin (1969) Cotton Crop States in the South 
Especially LA, AL, MS 
Banknote Discount (+) 
Higher Number of Failures 
Rousseau (2002) Interstate Transfers in 1836, Network 
Centrality, Log Deposits in New York 
Loans and Discounts (-), Specie (-), Circulation (-), 
Deposits (-), Banknote Discount (+) 
Pet Banking Theory Deposit Bank, holding constant transfers 
Deposit Banks in Mid-Atlantic and New 
England do worse 
Loans and Discounts (-), Specie (-), Circulation (-), 
Deposits (-), Banknote Discount (+) 
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IV.b. Data 
This paper utilizes two main datasets. The first was collected by Warren Weber and includes the balance 
sheets of 2,324 banks with observations ranging from 1794 to 1863 (Weber, 2008). For the purposes of this paper, 
only a subset of 414 banks from 1830 to 1842 is being used. Since I plan to explore New York in greater depth, the 
balance sheet data for the New York banks has been augmented with additional mid-year observations collected 
from the New York Commissioner’s Report in 1836 and 1837. They have also been cross-checked with the data I 
obtained from New York legislative documents to correct for inaccuracies.  The second dataset, collected by Gary 
Gorton and Warren Weber, contains the monthly quoted banknote discount listed in Philadelphia for all U.S Banks. 
The original data comes from the Bicknell's Reporter, Counterfeit Detector, and General Prices Current. 69  
Data was also collected from several other sources to augment the main datasets with additional key 
covariates.  One includes Weber’s census of Antebellum State banks, which contains all banks in existence in the 
United States between 1784 to 1861 along with the date they opened/closed and an indicator for whether or not they 
failed.70 This data is used to estimate the age of the bank at the time of the Panic and to explore the number of bank 
failures. The Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances in the years 1833 to 1839 
was used to identify deposit banks in 1833, 1835 and 1836. 71 The Treasury report also provides consistent balance 
sheet data for deposits banks from 1833 to 1836.  Data on the transfer drafts drawn between banks in the 
supplemental transfers in 1836 was found in the Report from the Secretary Treasurer in Senate Document no. 29 
from the 2nd Session of the 24th Congress.72 Complying with requests from the Senate on the 23rd of June, 
Secretary Treasury Woodbury submitted a report in December 1836 showing date and amount of transfers between 
individual banks starting from the 23rd of June 1836. There were 449 separate transfers ordered between July 6, 
1837 and December 15, 1836, with payment dates ranging from July 31, 1836 to April 15, 1837. The average 
payment amount was around $84,700, but drafts ranged from $10,000 to $500,000.  Data on the official Distribution 
of the Surplus was found in House Document 30 from the first session of the 25th Congress. 73 On September 25, 
1837, Woodbury submitted a report on the amount drawn in compliance with the the Deposit Act of 1836. The 
statement contains the date of the order, the number of the installment, the amount, which bank the draft was drawn 
on and to which state the draft was payable to. There were 338 separate transfers ordered between January 1837 and 
June 1837 with an average amount of around $81,964 but exhibiting high variability. The data on the transfers in 
1837 importantly differs from those in 1836 because we don’t know which banks were receiving the transfers in 
1837 on behalf of the states.74 Finally, I was able to identify the political affiliations of each bank using an article 
from the Albany Argus in October 1834.  
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 Gorton, Gary B. and Warren E. Weber. Quoted Discounts on State Bank Note Discounts in Philadelphia, 1832-1858. Research Department, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. http://cdm16030.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p16030coll4/id/3/rec/6 
70
 Weber, Warren E. (2015), Census of Early State Banks in the United States. 
71 United States. Department of the Treasury. Annual Report 1830-1840  
72 U.S. Congress Senate Document no. 29 24th Congress 2nd session (20, December 1836) page 8-20 
73 U.S. Congress  House Executive Document No. 30, 25th Congress 1st session (Sept 1837) page 72-81, and 101-45 
74 Although the details do not list the states, Bourne (1885:  44-124) and Temin (1969: 130) suggest that in many states the deposit banks 
coincides with the state’s choice of depository. Therefore they conclude that most of the intrastate transfers most likely stayed in the same bank. 
The six state known to use the federal government deposit banks were Alabama, Kentucky, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia  
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Constructing Variables of the Transfers 
 To construct a bank-level variable for the transfers in 1836 and 1837, the net of the total amount lost minus 
the total amount received was calculated for each bank. To be able discern which portion of the transfers is 
correlated with worse outcomes after the Panic, I constructed separate variables for the intrastate and interstate 
portion of the transfer in 1836 and 1837.  
 Since the impact of the transfers depends on the size of the bank, each of the four variables were 
standardized by expressing them as a percentage of capital observed on the 11th of September 1836. I chose capital 
over assets because total assets fluctuate significantly over the course of a year, especially in the volatile pre-Panic 
years.  Since banks in different states reported their balance sheets at different times, I was unable to find a uniform 
date in 1836 to measure total assets using Weber’s Dataset.  Although observations on the September 11th 1836 are 
available for each of the deposit banks in the Secretary of the Treasury’s report, part of the transfers would have 
already taken place which would skew the relative size of the transfer for some of the banks. Capital, on the other 
hand, is not directly affected by the transfers and is much more stability over time. Therefore, both the transfers in 
1837 and 1836 have been expressed as a percentage of capital observed on September 11th 1836, which also makes 
them more easily comparable. Expressing them as a percentage of capital would have also been similar to the way 
Woodbury perceived the transfers, given the 3/4ths rule in Deposit Act of 1836.  
 
Interpretation of Outcome Variables  
 From the two main datasets containing the balance sheet items and the banknote discounts, there are five 
outcomes of interest: loans and discounts, notes in circulation, individual deposits, specie, and the quoted banknote 
discount in Philadelphia. Previous literature on financial panics has used the number of suspensions rather than 
balance sheet items as the outcome variable, which can be problematic since banks have control over their balance 
sheets. 75 However, balance sheets can also be advantageous since there is greater variation in outcomes. Even 
though the bank can influence those outcomes to a certain extent, if they are facing particularly severe runs their 
balance sheets will reflect that. Furthermore, during banking crises when interest rates are high and there are signals 
of insolvency, banks tend to reduce lending, which is the main source of note and deposit creation. Wallis (2001: 31) 
uses balance sheet items in his analysis of the role state debt played in of the Panic of 1839. He interprets deposits as 
a measure of consumer confidence in banks, loans and discounts as a measure of bank's own confidence, and specie 
as a measure of liquidity. He notes that circulation is slightly more problematic, especially during suspension. Temin 
(1969: 114) suggests that “since [banks] were no longer obligated to maintain the price of their notes and deposits in 
terms of gold and silver, they were able to issue them very easily.76 However, circulation can still be a useful 
measure of public confidence as it represented the banks most liquid liability. Bankers would also be aware of the 
fact that the suspension was temporary, so it would not be in the bank’s best interest to take advantage of the 
                                                
75Carlson (1983), Calomiris, Charles W, Mason, Joseph R. (2003) , Richardson, Gary (2006: 1615–1646)  
76  Temin (1969: 114) is citing Hammond (1957: 478) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963:  167, 328-29) 
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suspension and expand notes or deposits.  Contemporary evidence also suggests that the runs in New York were 
predominantly by note holders, which would make it an especially important outcome in New York.  
The final outcome variable is the quoted discount of a bank’s note in Philadelphia. Banknotes were non-
interest bearing debt claims that could be redeemed at par for specie at the issuing bank. But as the notes traveled 
further away from the issuing bank, they would be redeemed for specie at a discount.  In general, the discount 
represented the cost of redeeming the note back to the issuing bank, but as Gorton (1991) suggests, it also revealed 
information about bank-specific risks. The average banknote discount of all the banks in a particular state reflected 
transportation costs, and deviations from that average reflected bank specific default risk .77 As a market price, this 
serves as an additional outcome that banks have little direct control over.  
IV.c. Empirical Strategy 
To rigorously test each of the theories, I employ a differences-in-differences strategy focusing on several 
different variables as the treatment. These include: the amount of interstate and intrastate transfers in 1836 and 1837, 
whether or not the bank was a deposit bank, the amount on deposit in New York, and the bank’s eigenvector 
centrality within the interbank payments network.  The basic model applied to the different datasets consists of 
estimating !"#$ = &" + ($ + )#*+#,- .	1 1234	15678$ + 9:"	.	1 1234	15678$ " + ;"< + =>   (1)  
 
where y represents the dependent variable, which includes the log of loans and discounts, the log of circulation, the 
log of deposits, the log of specie and the banknote discount for bank i in state s in time t.  &"	and ($  represent 
individual bank and time fixed effects. The parameter )# is a set of  state indicator variables interacted with a post-
Panic indicator to capture the differential change across states. :"	represents a variable of interest for bank i and is 
interacted with a post-Panic indicator, so 9would be the coefficient of interest. Finally, X is a vector of bank level 
controls.  This includes the pre-Panic reserve ratio, the pre-Panic log of capital, the age of the bank at the time of the 
Panic, and if the bank was located in a major city, all interacted with the post-panic indicator. 78 The pre-Panic 
reserve-ratio captures differences in liquidity, while the pre-Panic log capital should capture differences in the 
strength and size of the banks. Age controls for differences in the reputation of the bank as well as the political 
climate the bank was chartered in.  The indicator for being located in a city captures differences between banking 
practices in city and country banks. Banks in major cities tended to serve more  
V. New York Bank Balance Sheets 
I begin my analysis by focusing on the balance sheets of the banks in New York.  New York was where the 
Panic began, and is central to many of the theories in the literature in addition to my own. Furthermore, the New 
                                                
77 Gorton (1991) finds that market participants were able to properly price the inherent risks in these securities 
78
 For the New York Banks, the variable for major urban city is replaced with a indicator for if the bank is located in New York City. Albany is 
included as a major urban area.  
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York banks saw by far the largest changes in aggregate circulation, deposits, loans, and specie, which fell by 38%, 
29%, 16% and 50% respectively.79 
 
Data 
The data set for the New York banks contains the balance sheets of ninety-eight banks observed from 1835 
to 1839. The one bank that is crucially missing is the Dry Dock Company, which closed during the Panic. A formal 
investigation was carried out, and the committee concluded that the bank was illiquid but not insolvent. However, it 
is unclear why their balance sheet was not reported until 1842.  An 1838 investigation by the bank commissioners 
found Dry Dock to not be insolvent but rather highly illiquid.80  Since the Dry Dock Bank was hit particularly hard, 
its omission will underestimate the effects for deposit banks.  
Each bank is observed annually on the 1st of January from 1835 to 1838 as well as monthly from June 
1837 to January 1839. There are also additional observations of specie, circulation, and loans discounts from July 
1835 to July 1836. I construct three pre-Panic variables for each bank, using observations on January 1, 1837. These 
include the log of capital, and the specie and cash reserve ratios. The log of capital should capture differences in the 
size and strength of the banks, and the specie and cash reserve ratios serve as a measure of liquidity.  
The political affiliations of the New York banks were identified in an opinion piece found in the Albany 
Argus on October 1834. Although the author of the op-ed is not known, the Albany Argus was a well known 
political organ of the Albany Regency. The article’s purpose was to suggest that there were not enough banks under 
Democratic control. The author accomplishes this by showing that a majority of the banks in New York were 
controlled by the opposition, despite allegations that the New York Safety Fund System was “in the hands of the 
Democratic party.”  The author identifies banks’ political affiliation by determining whether a majority of the board 
directors and stockholders were “friends of the administration” or part of the political opposition. For fourteen of the 
banks, they were unable to definitively identify a political majority. Given the author’s slant, he likely understates 
the number of Democratic banks and overestimates the number of opposition banks. In this case, the political 
opposition might have included more banks that were politically ambiguous. Additionally the political friends would 
have represented the most blatantly friendly banks. Of the seventy-six Safety Fund banks in 1834, 31 percent were 
identified as political friends, 50 percent as part of the political opposition and 19 percent were not ascertained.  
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2. There is large variability in the balance sheet items of the New 
York banks. On average, banks had a paid-in capital of around $400,000, notes in circulation of $200,000, specie of 
$60,000, and deposits of $200,000. However, the largest banks had paid-in capital five times the average, and two 
million more in specie than the average bank. Differences in circulation, loans, and deposits are similarly large.  
Around twenty percent of the banks were located in New York City and were generally the largest banks in the state. 
Particularly interesting are the cash items of the bank, which ranged from zero to over a million dollars. What 
                                                
79 Percent change calculated with the aggregate level on January 1, 1837 and then July 1837 
80The investigation was published in June 1838 after gathering testimony at the Bank. The committee found evidence that the bank was lending 
extensive to various houses and many of them overdrew their funds from their accounts. In some cases, individual drew checks on accounts with 
inadequate funds. The investigation concluded that “frauds were practiced upon the bank” however the officers of the Dry Dock Bank were not 
aware of it, so they could find no reason to repeal their charter AD 318: Document of the Assembly of the State of New York sixty-first 1838  
Volume 6 296-367 
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constitutes a cash item is not exactly clear. Redlich (1952) suggests that these were deposits held in city banks that 
were treated like reserves.81 Nonetheless, during a panic, they would not have been worth the same as specie, which 
is why they have been calculated separately from the specie reserve ratio. The pre Panic specie reserve ratios were 
quite low with an average of 9.8 percent, but ranged from 3.1 percent to 43 percent. The bank with the highest pre 
reserve ratio was Bank of America which was one of the deposit banks.  
Figure 5 summarizes the total amount of transfers drawn from each bank in New York as a percentage of 
capital in 1836 and 1837. As shown in Figure 5a, a majority of the supplemental transfers out of New York were 
primarily drawn from three banks: Bank of America, Manhattan Company, and the Mechanics Bank. The other 
deposit banks were net recipients of the transfers. As seen in Figure 5b, those same three banks were drawn for 
much less in the 1837 transfers, although the 1837 transfers were very small, for all New York deposit banks. 
 
Results 
The results presented in Table 3 and Table 4 are focused on exploring the changes for the deposit banks 
based on their political affiliations. Preliminary regressions on the transfers alone and the transfers including deposit 
bank status did not yield any coefficients with an absolute value greater than two percent for any of the balance 
sheet items.  Furthermore, none of these results were statistically significant at the 5% or even 10% level. This 
refutes the Traditionalists, Rousseau (2002), Schreiber (1963), and Timberlake's (1960) suggestion that the transfers 
had large impact on deposit banks. Therefore, I focus on the deposit banks and their political affiliations. 
The regressions on the assets of the bank are presented in Table 3, and the liabilities in Table 4.  To 
compare the relative magnitude of the difference by deposit bank versus by political status, columns (1) and (6) only 
include the Deposit Bank x Post Panic variable and Columns (2) and (7) only include the political friend and 
political opposition x Post Panic variable. There appears to be no appreciable difference by just deposit bank status 
or by political affiliation. However, the estimates on the Political Opposition x Post Panic variable are consistently 
larger in the positive direction than the estimates on the political friends variable for every outcome.  
The model in Columns (4) and (9) of both Table 3 and Table 4 allows for different changes for deposit 
banks by political affiliation. The magnitude of the coefficients in Table 3 continues to be close to zero and not 
statistically significant even with the inclusion of the transfer variables in columns (5) and (10). However, in Table 4 
there were statistically significant differences for deposit banks by political affiliation after the inclusion of the 
transfer variables. The politically friendly deposit banks had 80 percent less circulation than the politically 
ambiguous deposit banks, and the political opposition deposit banks had 45 percent less notes in circulation than the 
politically ambiguous deposit banks, holding constant the amount of transfers.  In terms of circulation, it was the 
deposit banks that were political allies that did the worst.  
The effects for deposits were slightly different. The deposit banks had 74 percent less deposits than non 
deposit banks. However among deposit banks, the politically friendly banks had 80 percent more deposits than the 
politically ambiguous banks, whereas the opposition banks only had a 26 percent more deposits than the politically 
                                                
81 Redlich (1952:52) Estimates that in the 1830s, there were 5 million dollars in specie funds. “Specie funds are the same in character as demand 
deposits”, which were held in Boston, New Orleans, Philadelphia, New York. He suggests that they also may have been used for “illegitimate” 
ends, when a bank lent specie to another banks so they would comply with specie requirements.  
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ambiguous banks.82  This also suggests deposit banks did worse than non deposit banks. But the difference between 
the opposition versus friendly deposit banks is opposite to what was found for circulation.  
These results do not address Temin’s theory of an asset shock, but generally support his suggestion that the 
transfers in both 1836 and 1837 had small effects. The absolute value coefficients for the transfers in columns (5) 
and (10) show a less than two percent difference for all balance sheet items and is not statistically significant, with 
the exception of the intrastate transfers in 1837 and the interstate transfers 1836 for circulation.   The results show 
that a one percentage point increase in the amount of intrastate transfers in 1837 as a percent of capital is associated 
with 62 percent more notes in circulation. And a one percentage point increase in the amount of interstate transfers 
in 1836 as a percent of capital is associated with 2.6 percent more notes in circulation. This positive effect contrasts 
with prior theories. This suggests that the 1837 transfers drew from the stronger banks.  Overall the results are most 
consistent with the pet banking theory. In New York, controlling for the transfers, 48 percent of the decline in 
deposits, 39 percent of the decline in circulation, 49 percent of the decline in deposits, and 39 percent of the decline 
in deposits was due to deposit bank status.83  
VI.  All U.S. Bank Balance Sheets 
To explore if the effects found in New York apply to the rest of the country, I expand the analysis to 
include the balance sheets of all U.S Banks.  
 
Data 
The original dataset collected by Warren Weber includes 2,324 banks with observations from years 1794 to 
1863.84 I took several steps to clean the dataset. Observations outside of the window between 1830 to 1842 were 
dropped since observations beyond those cutoffs do not necessarily reflect the pre and post Panic trends. Then banks 
with less than two observations from January 1835 to May 1837 and from May 1837 to January 1839 were removed 
because pre and post Panic trends could not be accurately estimated. Finally, banks with less than one observation 
within a one-year window before and after the Panic were removed. This was because a lack of observations closer 
to the Panic tends to weaken the observed effect. Banks with a higher frequency of observations close to the Panic 
might appear to be more impacted in contrast to those with a low frequency of observations close to the Panic 
simply due to differences in reporting.  
Because banking was regulated at the state level, the frequency and timing of bank balance sheets varied 
greatly by state. Table 5 shows the mean and mode number of observations per bank in each state for the Weber’s 
original dataset from 1830 to 1839.  Differences in the mode and average number of observations indicate that the 
number of observations per bank also varies within state, which could be for two reasons. In some cases, only a 
                                                
82 Percentages from column (10) of Table 4, calculated as 100*(1- e^b) 
83 Note: coefficients in calculation for specie and loans only significant at 10% level. The percentages were calculated by taking the coefficients 
on the deposit bank variables in columns (5) and (10) in Table 3 and 4 and calculating the percent difference for deposit banks. Then I multiplied 
the percent change for the politically ambiguous, friend and opposition deposit banks to their 1836-1837 pre panic level, and added them to get 
the total change for deposit banks. Then I divided it by the total change for all banks.  
84 Weber, Warren E. 2008. Balance sheets for U.S. Antebellum State Banks. Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. 
http://cdm16030.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/about/collection/p16030coll5  
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specific set of banks were required to report. For example, in New York only the Safety Fund Banks were required 
to report annually. Secondly several banks failed after the Panic.  As shown in Table 6, out of the 675 banks that 
were open before the Panic of 1837, 41 of them closed or failed before October 1839.  All of the banks that failed or 
closed before June 1838 were not included, but those that failed or closed after 1838 and still met the criteria above 
were. Five of the banks that failed before 1838 were deposit banks, so the results tended to underestimate the effect 
for the deposit banks. Another problem that arose from the differential frequencies in reporting was that the same 
date could not be used to calculate pre-Panic reserve ratio or pre-Panic log of capital for each bank. Instead, the pre-
Panic observation that lies closest to the Panic was used.  
The number of banks per state in the final dataset is shown in Figure 6. All banks in Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, Indiana, and Georgia were dropped according to the criteria described above. In Massachusetts and 
Michigan, several of the banks that failed or closed were dropped due to a lack of observations. This will 
underestimate the adverse effects of the Panic. Additionally, a large number of the banks that closed or failed in 
New England, and Michigan were deposit bank, which will tend to underestimate the effects for deposit banks in the 
New England and the Northwestern regions.  Although several banks were dropped, state banking systems in the 
same region were very similar and each region of the country is fairly well represented in the data.  Summary 
statistics for the final dataset are presented in Table 7. The percent changes in the aggregate loans, specie, circulation 
and deposits were 8%, 17%, 25% and 27% respectively.85  
 
Results 
To match the window used for the New York banks, the main set of regressions uses the observations from 
1835 to 1839.  The results are presented in Tables 8 and 9. Similar to the results found in New York, the deposit 
banks on average saw 20% less deposits compared to non deposit banks as shown in column (7) of Table 9. Broken 
down by region in column (8), it becomes clear that the negative effect for all deposit banks primarily captures the 
effect for the deposit banks in the Mid-Atlantic. Inclusion of the transfer variables in columns (10) to (12) only 
increases the magnitude of the coefficients. The same trend is mirrored in regressions on circulation, specie, and 
lending. Although it is not significant for circulation and loans. In general, by all measures, the deposit banks in the 
Mid-Atlantic were more adversely affected. 
  This is consistent with the hypothesis that the Panic was driven by a loss of confidence in the Democratic 
pet banking system. The pet banks in the Mid-Atlantic were arguably the most important banks in the deposit bank 
system. Six out of the original seven deposit banks were located in the Mid-Atlantic. It is also consistent that the 
deposit banks in the Southern and Western regions were not as adversely affected, since these banks were less 
associated with the administration. The fact that the deposit banks in New England did better than those in the Mid-
Atlantic is contradictory to the hypothesis, but the omission of five failed deposit banks in Massachusetts and Maine 
most likely weakened the effect. 
                                                
85 Calculated the percent change using the average level from 1836 to 1837 and the average level from 1837 to 1838 for all the banks in the final 
dataset.  
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The magnitude and sign of the coefficients on all of the transfer variables is also consistent with what was 
found in New York. The absolute value of the estimates for all of the transfer variables in the regressions on all four 
of the balance sheet items are less than 2 percent and are not statistically significant, with the exception of the 
regression of the log of deposits on the interstate transfers in 1837. As seen in column (12) of Table 8, a one 
percentage point increase in the amount of interstate transfers in 1837 as a percent of capital is associated with 11.6 
percent more deposits. The positive effect is contrary to what was predicted by prior scholars. It suggests that 
stronger banks were drawn from in the transfers in 1837.  
Figures 7 and 8 present estimates on the Region x Post variables from the specifications in column (6) and 
(12) of Tables 8 and 9. The Mid-Atlantic is the omitted region. The pictures are consistent with Wallis’s (2001) 
finding that the banks in the Northeast were hit particularly hard during the Panic of 1837. For all balance sheet 
items, the banks in all other regions did better on average than the banks in Mid-Atlantic. The exception was the 
Southwest which saw significantly less specie on average after the Panic. The fact that the banks in the Southwest 
and the Southeast saw similar changes in the amount of lending to the banks in the Mid-Atlantic is somewhat 
consistent with Temin’s story. If there was a shock was from a drop in the price of cotton, banks in the South should 
have scaled back lending to a greater extent as seen in Figure 7a.  
The long-term effects are investigated by expanding the window to observations from 1830 to 1842. The 
results presented in Table 10 and 11 are consistent with those from the shorter window except the magnitude of the 
effect for the Mid-Atlantic deposit banks is larger, and the difference between the Mid-Atlantic deposit banks and 
the deposit banks in other regions is more pronounced. This suggests that the impact of the panic on deposit banks in 
the Mid-Atlantic had longer lasting effects which is consistent with a deeper, fundamental collapse in the deposit 
bank system. Fraud and the transfers certainly could have contributed to fears about the liquidity and solvency of 
deposit banks. However, the increased magnitude for the effects over the longer window is more consistent with the 
demise of the system’s political clout and eventual disbandment.  
VII.  The Interbank Payments Network 
To explore how the Panic could have spread, this section focuses on constructing the interbank payments 
system to create two variables to merge with the bank balance sheet data in section VI. The first variable measures 
the banks’ centrality in the network and the second variable measures the number of deposits the bank held in New 
York. This will allow me to address the theory of a liquidity crisis suggested by Timberlake (1960), Schreiber 
(1963) and Rousseau (2002).  
The incidence of interbank relationships in the 1830s is well documented.86  However, fairly little is known 
about the specific interbank relationships because balance sheets only showed the total amounts due to and from 
individual banks.  Interbank relationships were a necessary part of clearing payments across regions and funding 
seasonal changes in lending. While interbank cooperation can be a stabilizing factor by helping coordinate shocks in 
times of panic, they can also accelerate its spread. The random withdrawal theory suggests that panics can be 
                                                
86 Gibbons (1858), Redlich (1947), Calomiris and Gorton (1991: 103) , Weber(2003) 
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On January 14 1836, Woodbury presented a report to the Senate Committee on Finance that detailed the 
condition of the each of the 35 deposit banks.87 The report contained biweekly balance sheet statements that showed 
the individual amounts due to and from other banks over a four to five month period between January 1835 to 
January 1836.  Each deposit bank had around 3 to 8 observations, but for the purposes of constructing the interbank 
payments network, only the latest observation for each bank was used. In the final network, 76 percent of the 
observations were taken between the 1st of December 1835 to January 1836. Although the rest of the observations 
are collected from February to December 1835, they are still good representations of the interbank relationships 
since they are very stable over the five month period. The only difference is that the exact amounts due to and from 
particular banks changes over time. The final network is shown in Figure 9a, where the blue lines represent the 
intrastate relationships and the red dots represent a New York Bank. The structure is consistent with what is 
described by Gibbons(1858) , Redlich(1951), and Weber(2003) and looks like a hub-and-spoke model where banks 
in major commercial cities were correspondents for particular banks in outlying cities who then served the country 
banks in their local area. For example, the New York City banks would have a single correspondent bank in Albany 
or Troy that would serve as correspondent for all adjacent banks in that county (Gibbons, 1858: 219-210). This 
would allow for greater efficiency in shifting liquidity between banks as well as making note collections easier. The 
Banks in New York City, particularly the Wall Street pet banks, held deposits for a large number of banks both in 
New York and outside the state, as shown in Figure 9b.  
It should be noted that the network directly represents relationships for banks in 1835 to 1836. Therefore 
banks that opened after 1836 are not observed in the network. Their omission might underestimate the results of a 
liquidity shock if they were highly connected, since newer banks would have been more susceptible to shocks. 
Furthermore, the network might have changed from 1836 to the beginning of 1837. However, Weber (2003) 
suggests that these relationships were fairly stable over time, and the other observations for each deposit bank over 
the 4 to 5 month window corroborate that.88  
Additionally, I was only able to observe the interbank relationships through the balance sheets of the 
deposits banks. Therefore the network only contains banks that had a relationship with a deposit bank. Despite this 
fact, the network contains 441 out of the 588 banks that were open in 1836. These missing banks were smaller 
country banks that would not have been directly connected to a major city bank or deposit bank. 89 Fifty percent of 
the banks that I observed in the network were located in a major city, whereas only five percent of the missing banks 
were. The average capital stock of the observed banks was also 500,000 more than the missing banks. The omission 
of these banks would only matter if they were really smaller but happened to be highly connected. Then their 
                                                
87 The report is from Page 24 to 741, 24th congress 1st session, Senate Document 312. 
88 Warren Webber (2003) was able to observe individual interbank relationships for Pennsylvania Banks from 1851 to 1859, and found that most 
banks had highly stable relationships with a correspondent Banks.  
89 Weber (2003) Finds that country banks usually had a single correspondent in a city that then had relationships with larger financial centers.  
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omission would underestimate the effects, since smaller banks are more susceptible to liquidity shocks.90  
Importantly, these limitations mean the results are mainly generalizable to larger, older and more highly connected 
banks.  
 
Constructing Network Variables 
 In a study of the Panic of 1893, Calomiris and Carlson (2016) divided the banks into groups based on 
whether they were a central reserve bank, a bank in a reserve city, or a country bank. They found that a bank’s 
location in the tiered reserve structure is correlated with its vulnerability to a liquidity crisis.91  To construct a similar 
designation, I calculate the eigenvector centrality for each bank.  
There are various measures to quantify the importance of a node within a network. Eigenvector centrality 
estimates the importance of a particular node relative to the importance of the nodes it is connected to, which makes 
it the best measure to capture the hierarchical nature of the network. It is also advantageous over other metrics such 
as degree centrality and betweenness centrality for situations in which we are unable to observe the complete 
network of interbank relationships.92 
The eigenvector centrality for each bank ranges from zero to one, where a value closer to one indicates a 
higher level of bank connectivity. Figure 10 shows the distribution of the eigenvector centrality variable.  The 
rightward skew makes sense given the network’s hierarchical nature and the non-negative value of the variable. A 
high eigenvector centrality is positively correlated with being located in a city, being a deposit bank, and having 
more capital.  Figure 12 shows the eigenvector centrality for banks with an eigenvector centrality in the 90th 
percentile. A majority of those banks are located in Mid-Atlantic and the South. With the exception of Ohio, none of 
the other banks in the north west have a very high eigenvector centrality.  
The second variable created from the network is the total amount of deposits a bank held at a New York 
Bank. This will allow me to test Rousseau (2002) and Timberlake's (1960) theories that the Panic was caused by a 
liquidity crisis in New York.  In order to take the log, I added one to each bank. As seen in Figure 12 the banks that 
held the largest amounts on deposit in New York were deposit banks located in major cities. Also there is at least 
one bank from every state that held deposits in New York, with the exceptions of Rhode Island, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Georgia, Indiana and Missouri.  
After merging the bank-level variables with the cleaned bank balance sheet data set from section VI, the 
final data set has 2,032 observations for 222 banks. Figure 13 shows the number of banks in each state that are 
included in the final dataset, and the Table 12 shows the summary statistics. 
 
Results 
                                                
90 Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007) 
91 Calomiris Carlson (2016) , Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007) 
92 Because the network is observed through the deposit banks, metrics such as betweenness centrality, which is calculated by counting the 
number of times the node is in the shortest paths between all unique pairs of nodes, will be zero for most non deposit banks because we cannot 
observe their correspondents.  
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The results exploring differences in deposits are presented in Table 13 which has been split into two 
separate panels. The Panel A presents the results for all U.S. Banks, and Panel B presents the results for all U.S. 
banks omitting New York in order to estimate the effect of holding more deposits in New York in 1836. The results 
for the other balance sheet items are not displayed since the coefficients were not statistically significant, and their 
magnitudes implied a less than 8 percent difference in the outcome.  
Panel A shows that higher connectivity in the network does not appear to decrease deposits more 
significantly. Column (1) shows that deposit banks had 27 percent less deposits after the Panic, which reflects the 
trend seen in Section 6. Column (2) shows that for a one standard deviation increase in the eigenvector centrality, 
the bank has 7.5 percent less deposits after the Panic.93 However, when including deposit bank status and the 
transfers in column (3), the estimate for eigenvector centrality decreases and is no longer statistically significant. 
The estimate for deposit banks is also slightly reduced, and no longer statistically significant. Note however that the 
estimates are less precise than in columns (1) and (2), since deposit banks are more likely to have a high eigenvector 
centrality.    
Turning to Panel B, I examine how ties to New York relate to differences in deposits for banks outside of 
New York. Compared to Columns (1) and (2) from panel A, Columns (5) and (6) show that there are slightly larger 
differences for deposit banks and more central banks outside of New York.  Column (7) shows that for a one percent 
increase in the amount of deposits in New York in 1836, a non-New York deposit bank saw 5.8 percent less deposits 
after the Panic. This suggests that part of the negative effect for deposit banks was due to them holding a greater 
amount of deposits in New York.  That effect increases to 6.66 percent in the final specification shown in column 
(8) which includes the all variables together. The magnitude for the estimate on eigenvector centrality also 
decreases, showing that a one standard deviation increase in the eigenvector centrality of the bank results in 6.33 
percent less deposits after the Panic. Inclusion of the centrality measures and transfers also increases the magnitude 
of the Deposit Bank variable, although it is not statistically significant given the increase in imprecision. These 
results show that higher centrality in the network leads to a decrease in deposits, but not by a large amount. And for 
deposit banks, holding more deposits in New York rather than being more central leads to a greater decrease in 
deposits.  This suggests that depositors of the pet banks that were highly connected to a New York banks feared that 
their bank was illiquid.   
 
Table 14 presents the same estimates except the window for the panel includes observations from 1830 to 
1842. The sign and the relative magnitudes are the same in columns (1), (2), (5) and (6). However, in the final 
specifications in column (4) and (8), deposit banks do much worse, having 40 percent less deposits after the Panic. 
Also deposit banks that were more central did significantly better. For a deposit bank, a one standard deviation 
increase in eigenvector centrality led to 9 percent more deposits. The effect for a deposit bank holding a greater 
amount of deposits in New York is also smaller. These results suggest that in the long run, the adverse effects for 
deposits banks are independent of their centrality in the network. This is bolstered by the fact that the more central a 
deposit bank was, the better they fared. However, this could also be due to the fact that more central deposit banks 
                                                
93 A 0.01 increase in eigenvector centrality corresponds to moving from the 10th to the 60th percentile 
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were more resilient to liquidity shocks.94 However, that fact that the decrease for deposit banks is larger and over a 
longer period suggests a deeper loss of confidence in the deposit banks. Together, the results in Tables 13 and 14 
suggest that a loss of confidence in deposit banks as well as concerns of liquidity were important, especially when 
the deposit banks was connected to New York. Rousseau, Timberlake, and Schreiber’s argument about the liquidity 
crisis in New York is correct to some degree: depositors of deposit banks heard news of the transfers and liquidity 
problems in New York, which instigated runs. However, the estimated effect of the network variables are very 
small, especially when compared to the effect of deposit bank status.  
VIII.  Banknote Discounts 
Data 
I now turn to the monthly quoted banknote discount listed in Philadelphia for all U.S Banks. As a market 
price, the banknote discount serves as an outcome that banks have little direct control over and better captures 
changes in public perception in regards to individual bank risk. The original dataset was collected by Gary Gorton 
and Warren Weber from Bicknell's Reporter, Counterfeit Detector, and General Prices Current, but I chose to use 
only observations from 1836 to 1838 in the main analysis. Since the effects of the Panic on banknote discounts 
began to erode by the end of 1837, I focus on a narrower time window to capture the more immediate effects of the 
crisis. Results for a wider time window are presented afterwards.  
The banknote discounts have the additional advantage of having consistent monthly observations for 85 
percent of banks.  Figure 14 shows how many banks in each state are observed in the dataset  Missing banks do not 
necessarily reflect missing data since some banknotes did not circulate outside the state of the issuing bank.95 Table 
15 presents the summary statistics. The average banknote discount is 1.85 percent, however it varies greatly by state 
and distance from Philadelphia. The regional composition of the dataset is similar to the bank balance sheets, with 
41 percent of banks located in the Mid-Atlantic and 33 percent of banks located in New England. To maintain the 
number of observations, the pre panic reserve ratio was not included.  Preliminary regressions on a subset of banks 
show that the results are robust to the omission of the pre reserve ratio variable. 
 
Results 
The results presented in Table 16 are consistent with the analysis of the bank balance sheets. As shown in 
column (1), the difference in the discount for the banknotes of deposit banks was 20.3 percentage points higher than 
non deposit banks, although the difference is only significant at the 10% level. Unlike other outcomes, higher 
discounts are a worse outcome. When analyzed by region in column (2) it becomes clearer that it was specifically 
the banknotes of deposit banks in the Mid Atlantic that had a larger increase in their discount. When the transfer 
variables are added in Columns (3), (4), and (5), the effect for deposit banks in the Mid-Atlantic becomes larger.  
                                                
94 This is consistent with work of Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer, and Alentorn (2007), Although speaking about the banking system as a whole, they 
find a non monotonic relationship between the degree of connectivity and increases in the “contagion effect” . Increases in connectivity increase 
instability, but over certain threshold it decreases.  
95 Laurence Ales, Francesca Carapella, Pricila Maziero, Warren E. Weber (2006), page 2, banknotes that circulated outside local area called 
“foreign notes” , some balance sheet have separate account that lists out of state notes versus local notes.  
   
38 
Furthermore, the banknote discount for the deposit banks in the Southeast continues to be statistically significantly 
lower than the banknote discount for deposit banks in the Mid-Atlantic. The estimates on the transfers variables 
show very small changes that are not statistically significant, with the exception of the total intrastate transfers in 
1837 in column (4). However, the effect is negative and increases when the transfers in 1836 are included in column 
(5). These results are contrary to both Timberlake and Rousseau’s assertion regarding the interstate transfers. To 
check that results are not being driven by outliers, Columns (6) and (7) present the results for the same regressions in 
(1) and (5) except observations that were over three standard deviations from the mean within state were removed. 
The direction of the effects are the same, but the magnitude is slightly smaller.  Figure 15 presents the estimated 
effect of deposit bank status on the banknote discount in the months before and after the panic. The estimates in the 
pre-panic period are fairly close to zero and do not suggest an underlying pre-Panic trend. They also change 
dramatically right after the Panic.  Thus it seems likely that the observed effect after the Panic was not due to pre-
existing differential trends in the banknote discount between the deposit banks and the non deposit banks.  
 To explore the effects over a longer time period and to maintain consistency with the window in section 5, 
6, and 7, Table 17 presents the results for observations between 1835 to 1839, and 1830 to 1839.  As seen in Panel A 
and B, the effects for deposit banks diminish and are close to zero. However, there is a statistically significant 
increase for deposit banks in columns (5) and (10) after observations that were over three standard deviations from 
the mean within state were removed. When a bank fails, their notes can still circulate for several months but the 
discount increases 100 to 500 percent. Removing the extreme data points increases the precision as seen in the 
standard errors of columns (4), (5), (9), (10). The differences in the magnitude between column (1) and (4) and (6) 
and (9) can be explained by the fact that more non deposit banks failed between January 1838 to January 1840, 
reducing the effect for deposit banks.  
Figure 16 shows the average change in the banknote discount from April 1837 to June 1837 by state. A 
larger change in the average banknote discount in Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Florida and Louisiana is 
consistent with Temin’s hypothesis of an asset shock related to a fall in the price of cotton. However, the pattern 
also suggests that the Panic could be related to asset deprecation through the fall in the price of land posited by the 
Traditionalists. Michigan had the largest amount of land sales in 1837, as well as the largest percent increase in the 
average banknote discount. As shown in Figure 3, the southernmost states, as well as Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio had 
large increases in land sales prior to the Panic, with percent changes in banknote discount of over 50% or more. 
Ultimately, the test is too coarse to conclusively determine which theory drove larger changes in banknote discount 
in the South. Cotton and land were very closely tied and the collapse of both markets is consistent with 
contemporary evidence and the results presented in Figure 16. Ultimately, the best way to test Temin’s theory would 
be to determine which banks held more assets tied to the price of cotton and seeing if those banks did worse after the 
panic. However, such detailed information from the 1830s is not available.  
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VIIII. Bank Failures 
To calculate the number and location of bank failures I use Warren Weber’s Census of Early State Banks in 
the United States (2005), which contains all banks in existence in the between 1784 to 1861 along with the date they 
opened/closed.  In addition, it reports whether the bank, closed, failed or stayed open until 1861.96  
Prior statistics of bank failures during the Panic of 1837 suggest a severe collapse in the banking system. 
Martin (1882) reports that 194 of the 729 banks with charters in 1837 were forced to close their doors. This statistic 
is slightly misleading because it includes the 91 free banks that opened after the Panic and failed within the next few 
years.  The number of failures calculated using Weber's dataset is presented in Table 6.97  As shown at the bottom of 
column(2) and (4), only 7 out of 645 banks failed between June 1837 and June 1838 and only 20 out of 645 banks 
failed between June 1837 and right before the Panic of 1839.  
As seen in column (2) and (4) there were failures in Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, 
Florida, and Maine. When also including the number of banks that closed, the numbers are higher in those same 
states. The concentration of failures in the Northeast is inconsistent the hypothesis suggesting asset depreciation 
from a drop in the price of cotton or land. However the low number of failures in the cotton south is not necessarily 
inconsistent with Temin’s hypothesis.98 Branch banking and interbank cooperation reduces the probability of bank 
failures by allowing bankers to better coordinate suspension before suffering failures. The southern banking system 
tended to have fewer more highly capitalized banks with multiple branches. Calomiris and Gorton (1991: 104) were 
able to document the suspensions in the Panic of 1839 from Hunt's Merchant’s Magazine and found that banks in 
more urban locations in the Mid-Atlantic, and the branch banking states in the South had a greater proportion of 
banks suspending, in contrast to the states in New England, the Northwest, and the Southeast, which had less 
uniformity in suspensions and a higher incidence of failures. Temin (1969: 143) also presents contemporary 
evidence that in late April, banks in New Orleans entered an arrangement to monitor each other's balance sheets and 
clear notes amongst each other avoid using specie. Coordination to suspend before facing more severe runs would 
have allowed these banks to stay open. However, suspensions were also temporary, and could only protect banks for 
a short period of time. If the asset depreciation was as bad as suggested, we might expect to see more failures 
concentrated in the South.  
To explore determinants of failure at the bank level, I employ a logistic regression on the probability of the 
bank failing between 1837 and 1839. Summary statistics are presented in Table 18 and the results in Table 19. The 
cut offs for the time periods have been chosen to correspond with a month after the resumption, and the month 
before the Panic of 1839. Column (1) shows that the odds of a deposit bank failing from May 1837 to June 1838 are 
3.47 times higher than non deposit banks. When controls are included in column (2) and then state fixed effects in 
column (3) the effect is larger. Column (3) shows that the odds of a deposit bank failing from May 1837 to June 
1838 are 14.4 times higher than non deposit bank. Columns (4) to (6) present the same regressions except for 
                                                
96 Weber, Warren E. (2015), Census of Early State Banks in the United States. 
97 Weber (2005) Early State Banks in the United States: How Many Were There and When Did They Exist?:  He does not describe how he 
characterizes a failed versus closed bank 
98 Calomiris and Gorton (1991; 103), Calomiris and Schweikart (1991)  
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include failures from May 1837 to October 1839. In column (6) the odds have decreased to 6.33 but are still 
statistically significant. A higher probability of failure is consistent with the results from prior sections in showing 
deposit banks faced worse outcomes after the Panic. However, the results warrant further investigation into the 
individual causes of the deposit bank failures as well as the other banks.  
 
X. Conclusion 
Despite the wealth of literature, the proximate cause of the Panic remained unclear.  Prior studies of the era, 
while vast, have been hampered by an inability to assess changes at the micro level. Through the use of firm-level 
balance sheets and banknote discounts for a majority of antebellum banks, this thesis provides additional evidence 
with which to analyze some of the theories suggested in the literature.  
Examination of banknote discounts as well as balance sheets shows that the supplemental transfers in 1836 
and 1837 were not correlated with significantly adverse changes, as was predicted by Rousseau, Timberlake, and 
Schreiber. However, analysis of the network suggests that there may have been problems with liquidity. Deposit 
banks with stronger correspondent relationships in New York faced a greater loss in deposits. However, the effect 
was quite small.  The transfers may not have directly affected banks as suggested by Rousseau and Timberlake, but 
certainly contributed to fears of a liquidity crisis in New York. The Specie Circular would have only added to those 
fears.  
 The results pertaining to Temin’s (1969) argument are less conclusive. Although the state trends in 
banknote discounts after the Panic are consistent with a shock through the decline in the price of cotton, they are 
also consistent with the bursting of the land bubble. And greater increases in the banknote discounts and a higher 
concentration of failures in the Northwest better support the land bubble theory presented by traditionalists. 
However, the change in the average state banknote discount is too coarse of a measure to be sure. Also analysis of 
bank failures at the state level is complicated by differences in the types of banking systems. Ultimately, the general 
inconsistencies suggest that further analysis regarding Temin’s theory is warranted. Ideally, we would be able to 
observe the portfolios of individual banks, to determine which banks were exposed to more risk related to land or 
cotton. Then we could determine if those banks faced worse outcomes after the Panic. However, balance sheets with 
such detail are not available.  
The results most consistently suggest that the Panic was driven by a loss of confidence in the Democratic 
pet banking system. Starting in New York where the Panic began, I find that deposit banks saw greater decreases in 
circulation and deposits across the Panic. For deposit banks, there were stark differences in outcome by political 
affiliation, which further affirms the fact that confidence in the Jacksonian Democratic banking system had eroded 
and had a significant catalyzing effect on the Panic. The same effect was present nationally. In terms of deposits, 
banknote discount, and probability of failure, deposit banks saw significantly worse outcomes, with the more 
strongly politically affiliated banks of the Mid-Atlantic receiving especially hard outcomes.  Despite the exoneration 
of Jackson’s role in the Panic by some scholars, the pet banking system created by Jackson left the country 
vulnerable to collapse.  Once confidence in this system eroded, the country was left in a dire financial state. 
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Figure 1:  Amount of Federal Deposits at Individual Deposit Bank from 1835 to 1839 
 
Figure 1 presents the amount of federal deposits at each deposit bank from 1835 to 1839. The y-axis is the 
name of the deposit bank, and the x axis is the amount of federal deposits at the bank in thousands of 
dollars. Colors represent the year the observation was from. All the observations in 1836 were taken after 
the Deposit Act of 1836. Source: United States. Department of the Treasury. “ [1835-1839 Inclusive],” 




Figure 2: Summary of the Interstate Transfers in 1836 to 1837 
 
Figure 2a: Interstate Transfers in the Supplemental 
Transfers ordered from June 1836 to January 1837 
 
Figure 2b: Interstate Transfers in the first two installments of the 
Official Distribution of the Surplus from January 1837 to April 1836
                           
Figure 2a summarizes the interstate portion of the supplemental 
transfers from June 1836 to January 1837. Each line represents a 
transfer between two banks in different states. The arrows are 
pointing in the direction of the Bank receiving the funds. The width 
of the line corresponds to the relative amount of funds.  
Source: 24th Congress Senate Doc 29 
Figure 2b summarizes the interstate portion of the first two 
installments of the Official distribution from January 1837 to April 
1837. Each line represents a transfer between two banks in different 
states. The arrows are pointing in the direction of the Bank receiving 
the funds. The width of the line corresponds to the relative amount of 
funds. Source: House Executive Document No. 30, 25th Congress 1st 





Figure 3: Temin’s (1969) Main Evidence 
 
(+) News of the rejections by BOE reach New York (28 September 1836) 
(*) Failure of Hermann Briggs & Co. on 4th March 1837 
Table 4 Summarizes the evidence presented by Temin(1969 : 139) . The 60 Day Bills on London and the Discount Rates on Commercial Paper are 
observed in New York and Boston. The colored lines mark significant events.  
The data was compiled by Wallis(2001 : 35).  Original Source: Exchange Rates on 60 Days Bills from Smith and Cole, Fluctuations (1969:190) ; 
Discount Rates from Smith and Cole, Fluctuations (1969:192) : Cotton Prices, Gray, History of Agriculture (1860, 1027) 
The discount rates on commercial paper in Boston and New York from Smith and Cole were averaged between numbers collected by Bigelow’s Tariff 




Figure 4: Public Land Sales in Ohio Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri and Five Southern States (Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, 
Florida) from 1830 – 1845 
 
Figure 4, presents the amount of Public land sales in thousands of dollars in various states from 1830 to 1834.  
Source: Douglas C north, The Economic Growth of the United States 1790 – 1860 . pp 257, 256, 
Table A-X, Public Land Sales Five Southern (Arkansas, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida) and Cotton Prices (Average New York Prices for 
Middling Uplands) 1814 - 1860 (thousands of dollars and cents) and  
Table A-XI Land Sales, Seven Western States, 1815-1860 (Ohio Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Iowa, Wisconsin, Missouri) (in thousands of dollars) 






Table 2: Summary Statistics: New York Bank Balance Sheets: 1835 to 1839 
 
Variable  Description mean sd min max 
Circulation  Banknotes in circulation in dollars 190673 140675 4267 1098333 
Specie  Specie reserves in dollars 56746 152815 1188 2187455 
Loans and Discounts  Loans and bills discounted (excluding bills of exchange) in dollars  757118 900311 0 5697969 
Deposits Deposits in dollars 199306 414232 3075 4413321 
Cash items  Checks and other cash items in dollars 17758 67714 0 1129312 
Capital Paid in Capital in dollars, excluding retained earnings 382161 442062 10000 2001200 
Net interstate transfers 1836 
as pct capital 
  Net amount drawn from the bank in of the interstate portion of the1836 
transfers expressed as a percent of the bank‘s capital in January 1837 0.030 0.178 -0.330 1.077 
Net intrastate transfers 1836 
as pct capital 
  Net amount drawn from the bank in the intrastate portion of the 1836 transfers 
expressed as a percent of the bank‘s capital in January 1837 -0.088 0.323 -0.973 1.358 
Total interstate transfers 
1837 as pct capital 
Total amount drawn from the bank in the interstate portion of the1837 transfers 
expressed as a percent of the bank‘s capital in January 1837  0.021 0.054 0 0.216 
Total intrastate transfers 
1837 as pct capital 
 Total amount drawn from the bank in the intrastate portion of the 1837 transfers 
expressed as a percent of the bank‘s capital in January 1837 0.032 0.077 0 0.362 
Deposit Bank Indicator variable for if the banks was a Deposit Bank in 1833, 1835, or 1836  0.201 0.401 0 1 
Pre Panic Specie Reserve 
Ratio  
 The specie reserve ratio observed in January 1837, calculated as specie / 
(Circulation + Deposits + (Due to – Due From)) 0.098 0.066 0.031 0.427 
Pre Panic Cash Reserve 
Ratio  
 The cash reserve ratio observed in January 1837, calculated as Cash Items / 
(Circulation + Deposits + (Due to – Due From))  0.040 0.078 0 0.417 
Pol Friends 
Indicator for if the Bank was identified as having a majority of “Political 
Friends” as shareholders or directors, in October 1834 in the Albany Argus  0.307 0.462 0 1 
Pol Opposition 
 Indicator for if the Bank was identified as having a majority of “Political 
Opposition” as shareholders or directors, in October 1834 in the Albany Argus 0.509 0.500 0 1 
Political Aff Unclear 
 Indicator for if the Bank was identified as having a ambiguous political 
affiliation, in October 1834 in the Albany Argus 0.184 0.388 0 1 
New York City Bank  Indicator Variable for if the Bank was located in New York City 0.249 0.433 0 1 
Age  The age of the Bank at the time of the Panic in years 12.621 10.817 1 46 
1,243 Observations, 98 Banks, beginning on the 1st of January 1835 to 1st of January 1839 inclusive, and are reported every 6 months before the 






Figure 5a) Summary of the Supplemental Transfers 




Figure 5b) Summary of the Official Distribution of the Surplus  
in 1837 at New York Bank 
 
 
                             
 
Figure 5a) summarizes the supplemental transfers in New York. The 
y axis presents the net amount drawn from the bank in the 1836 
transfers as a percent of capital in November 1836. Negative values 
mean the bank received more money.  
 
Figure 5b) summarizes the official transfers in New York. The y axis 
presents the total amount drawn from the bank in the 1837 transfers 





Table 3: New York Bank Balance Sheets: OLS Regression on Assets 
 
Note: The first row presents the average loans and discounts, and specie in from Jan 1836 to May 1837; the standard deviation is presented in the brackets below. Observations are 
from January 1835 to January 1839. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects as well as controls for age, pre specie reserve ratio, pre cash reserve ratio, pre log capital, 
and a dummy for being located in New York City all interacted with a post panic indicator. Standard errors are clustered by bank. The political ambiguous banks are the omitted 
group in the regressions that include political affiliations. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 






Post Panic X Deposit Bank -0.049  -0.034 -0.040 -0.020 0.074  0.117 0.229 -0.573+ 
  (0.056)  (0.054) (0.094) (0.102) (0.212)  (0.209) (0.471) (0.309) 
 Political Friend  -0.096* -0.093+ -0.109+ -0.111+  -0.125 -0.135 -0.090 -0.100 
   (0.047) (0.047) (0.058) (0.058)  (0.179) (0.183) (0.180) (0.172) 
 Political Opposition  -0.040 -0.041 -0.030 -0.039  0.055 0.058 0.054 -0.009 
   (0.044) (0.044) (0.049) (0.048)  (0.172) (0.174) (0.184) (0.170) 
 Deposit Bank X            
  Political Friend    0.067 0.095    -0.233 0.159 
      (0.102) (0.126)    (0.610) (0.470) 
  Political Opposition    -0.045 -0.066    -0.041 0.070 
     (0.093) (0.082)    (0.486) (0.416) 
 Interstate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital     -0.314     -0.441 
      (0.191)     (0.599) 
 Intrastate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital     0.107     -0.502 
      (0.098)     (0.419) 
 Interstate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     0.075     2.016 
      (0.611)     (2.854) 
 Intrastate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     0.077     0.352 
      (0.247)     (1.693) 
Constant 13.760** 13.795** 13.788** 13.793** 13.781** 11.058** 11.091** 11.115** 11.108** 11.016** 
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.032) (0.096) (0.114) (0.115) (0.108) (0.102) 
Bank and Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 902 902 902 902 902 904 904 904 904 904 




Table 4: New York Bank Balance Sheets: OLS Regression on Liabilities 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 






 Post Panic X Deposit Bank -0.435+  -0.402* -0.080 -0.127 -0.117  -0.114 -0.685 -1.329** 
  (0.228)  (0.201) (0.336) (0.292) (0.238)  (0.238) (0.642) (0.362) 
 Political Friend  -0.333* -0.300* -0.174 -0.169  0.111 0.121 0.050 0.038 
   (0.158) (0.149) (0.158) (0.157)  (0.165) (0.173) (0.143) (0.135) 
 Political Opposition  -0.204 -0.211+ -0.216+ -0.164  0.193 0.192 0.062 -0.015 
   (0.123) (0.123) (0.129) (0.124)  (0.154) (0.150) (0.135) (0.129) 
 Deposit Bank X            
  Political Friend    -0.654 -1.621**    0.503 1.166** 
      (0.404) (0.372)    (0.645) (0.361) 
  Political Opposition    -0.133 -0.594*    0.794 1.031** 
     (0.335) (0.243)    (0.645) (0.322) 
 Interstate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital      1.268**     -0.972* 
      (0.291)     (0.395) 
 Intrastate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital      -0.202     -0.246 
      (0.180)     (0.197) 
 Interstate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital      -1.072     2.148 
      (1.749)     (1.557) 
 Intrastate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital      4.154**     -0.953 
      (1.046)     (1.088) 
Constant 11.551** 11.709** 11.628** 11.610** 11.695** 11.664** 11.673** 11.645** 11.627** 11.493** 
 (0.076) (0.073) (0.073) (0.072) (0.066) (0.080) (0.100) (0.091) (0.095) (0.081) 
Bank and Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 904 904 904 904 904 754 754 754 754 754 
R-squared 0.792 0.790 0.797 0.803 0.817 0.947 0.947 0.947 0.949 0.953 
Note: : The first row presents the average circulation, and deposits in from Jan 1836 to  May 1837; the standard deviation is presented in the brackets below . 
Observations are from January 1835 to January 1839. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects as well as controls for age, pre specie reserve ratio, pre 
cash reserve ratio, pre log capital, and a dummy for being located in New York City all interacted with a post panic indicator. Standard errors are clustered by 
bank. The political ambiguous banks are the omitted group in the regressions that include political affiliations. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. 





































Mean and Mode Number of Observations per Bank in each 
 State from 1835 to 1839 from Weber’s original dataset.  
State 
Mean Number of 
Observations 
Mode Number of 
Observations 
AL 6.67 7 
CT 3.19 3 
DC 5.43 5 
DE 4.75 5 
FL 5.75 5 
GA 5.07 6 
IL 8.5 7 
IN 4.78 5 
KY 28.67 27 
LA 5.77 6 
MA 5.42 6 
MD 7.24 9 
ME 10.56 14 
MI 8.67 10 
MS 5.1 5 
NC 4.8 7 
NH 8.15 9 
NJ 4.04 5 
NY 10.53 11 
OH 3.91 4 
PA 14.4 15 
RI 3.58 4 
SC 4.6 5 
TN 7 10 
VA 15.8 12 





Table 6: Number of Failed or Closed Banks in each State 
 


























AL 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CT 31 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DC 7 0 0 0 1 0 1 
DE 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
FL 6 1 3 1 3 2 4 
GA 17 0 0 0 0 1 3 
IL 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IN 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 
KY 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
LA 16 0 0 0 0 0 5 
MA 131 5 11 6 13 7 17 
MD 25 0 0 0 1 1 3 
ME 55 0 2 1 4 7 15 
MI 13 0 0 6 9 6 11 
MO 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
MS 12 0 0 3 4 10 12 
NC 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
NH 27 0 0 0 0 1 4 
NJ 27 0 1 0 2 1 4 
NY 98 0 1 0 1 5 6 
OH 33 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PA 49 1 1 2 2 3 3 
RI 62 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SC 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TN 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VA 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
VT 19 0 0 0 0 3 3 
WI 2 0 0 1 1 2 2 
Total 675 7 19 20 41 49 93 
 
Table 6 shows the total number of failed banks and the total number of failed or closed banks in each state 
for different time periods. Column (1) shows the number of banks in existence prior to the Panic in May 
1837. Specifically, this includes all the banks that opened before and closed after the Panic of 1837.  
Column (2) shows the number of banks that failed in each state between May 1837 and June 1838, a 
month after the New York Banks resumed specie payments. Column (3) shows the number of banks that 
failed or closed in each state between May 1837 and June 1838. Column (4) shows the number of banks 
that failed in each state between May 1837 and October 1839 (Panic of 1839). Column (5) shows the 
number of banks that failed or closed in each state between May 1837 and October 1839 (Panic of 1839).  
Finally, Columns (6) and (7) the number of banks that failed and closed between between May 1837 and 
January 1842, the end of the depression. Source: Weber, Warren E. (2015), Census of Early State Banks 




Figure 6: Number of Banks per State included in the U.S Bank Balance Sheet Dataset  
 
The transparent grey bars represent the number of banks in 1837 that opened before and closed after the Panic. The dark shaded area indicates the 




Table 7: Summary Statistics:  All U.S Bank Balance Sheets 
 
 Description mean sd min max 
Loans and discounts Loans and bills discounted (excluding bills of exchange) in dollars 767479 1256255 11948 11347480 
Specie and cash items Specie plus checks and other cash items in dollars 70644 166833 1003 1789048 
Circulation Banknotes in circulation in dollars 225099 441932 1680 3965703 
Deposits Deposits in dollars 174663 332977 1041 5566022 
Capital net of own stock Capital net of own stock, excluding retained earnings in dollars 499063 867318 10000 7820000 
Age The age of the Bank at the time of the Panic in years 13.763 11.402 0.358 55.925 
Major City 
Indicator variable for if the Bank is in a major city defined as a city 
with over 10,000 people in the 1835 Census 0.304 0.460 0 1 
Deposit Bank Indicator for if the Bank was a deposit bank in 1833, 1835, or 1836 0.149 0.356 0 1 
Net interstate transfers 
1836 as pct capital 
Net amount drawn from the bank in of the interstate portion of 
the1836 transfers expressed as a percent of the bank‘s capital in 
January 1837 -0.046 0.406 -5.830 3.289 
Net intrastate transfers 
1836 as pct capital 
Net amount drawn from the bank in the intrastate portion of the 
1836 transfers expressed as a percent of the bank‘s capital in 
January 1837 -0.016 0.175 -0.973 1.854 
Total interstate transfers 
1837 as pct capital 
Total amount drawn from the bank in the interstate portion of 
the1837 transfers expressed as a percent of the bank‘s capital in 
January 1837 0.004 0.025 0 0.216 
Total intrastate transfers 
1837 as pct capital 
Total amount drawn from the bank in the intrastate portion of the 
1837 transfers expressed as a percent of the bank‘s capital in 
January 1837 0.041 0.123 0 0.844 
Pre Log Capital 
Log of the capital observed in the period closest but before the 
panic 12.401 1.099 9.616 15.761 
Pre Reserve Ratio 
The reserve ratio observed in the period closest but before the 
panic, calculated as (specie + cash items) / (Circulation + Deposits 
+ (Due to – Due From)). 0.142 0.130 0.006 0.964 





Table 8: All U.S. Bank Balance Sheets 1835 to 1839: OLS Regression on Assets 
Note:  The first row presents the average amount of loans and discounts, and specie from Jan 1836 to May 1837; the standard deviation is presented in the brackets below. 
Observations are from January 1835 to January 1839. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects as well as controls for age, pre specie reserve ratio, pre cash reserve ratio, 
pre log capital, state, and a dummy for being located in a Major city all interacted with a post panic indicator. Standard errors are clustered by bank. Columns (1) to (6) present 
regressions on the log of Loans and Discounts. Columns (7) to (12) present regressions on the log of Specie and Cash Items. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses.  
** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES log Loans and Discounts log Specie and Cash Items 





Post Panic X Deposit Bank  -0.029     0.041     
   (0.045)     (0.093)     
 Deposit Bank X Mid – Atlantic  -0.080 -0.107+ -0.138+ -0.135+  -0.207+ -0.263** -0.457** -0.460** 
    (0.053) (0.062) (0.077) (0.082)  (0.109) (0.101) (0.169) (0.168) 
  New England  0.154* 0.140 0.171* 0.154+  0.611* 0.634** 0.699** 0.691** 
    (0.070) (0.088) (0.081) (0.089)  (0.236) (0.229) (0.240) (0.236) 
  Northwest  -0.113 -0.060 -0.091 -0.037  0.291 0.365+ 0.402+ 0.438+ 
    (0.178) (0.152) (0.183) (0.152)  (0.228) (0.217) (0.239) (0.233) 
  Southeast  0.068 0.054 0.106 0.077  0.265+ 0.292+ 0.437* 0.422* 
    (0.085) (0.098) (0.095) (0.102)  (0.155) (0.157) (0.177) (0.180) 
  Southwest   0.197 0.194 0.222 0.214  0.451* 0.476** 0.574** 0.568** 
   (0.163) (0.152) (0.163) (0.156)  (0.176) (0.160) (0.174) (0.171) 
 Net Interstate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    -0.065  -0.072   -0.043  -0.043 
    (0.068)  (0.075)   (0.083)  (0.090) 
 Net Intrastate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    -0.048  -0.019   -0.170  -0.080 
    (0.060)  (0.072)   (0.129)  (0.158) 
 Total Interstate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     0.509 0.529    2.428* 2.157 
     (0.479) (0.557)    (1.087) (1.330) 
 Total Intrastate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     0.111 0.018    0.423 0.375 
    (0.222) (0.235)    (0.262) (0.298) 
Constant 14.656** 14.693** 14.683** 14.691** 14.683** 12.179** 12.232** 12.220** 12.224** 12.216** 
 (0.037) (0.069) (0.062) (0.066) (0.061) (0.072) (0.069) (0.067) (0.065) (0.065) 
Firm and Time FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 




Table 9: All U.S. Bank Balance Sheets 1835 to 1839: OLS Regression on Liabilities 
Note: The first row presents the average amount of notes in circulation, and deposits from Jan 1836 to May 1837; the standard deviation is presented in the brackets below. 
Observations are from January 1835 to January 1839. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects as well as controls for age, pre specie reserve ratio, pre cash reserve ratio, 
pre log capital, state, and a dummy for being located in a Major city all interacted with a post panic indicator. Standard errors are clustered by bank. Columns (1) to (6) present 
regressions on the log of Circulation. Columns (7) to (12) present regressions on the log of Deposits. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES log Circulation log Deposits 





Post Panic X Deposit Bank  -0.066     -0.235*     
   (0.088)     (0.101)     
 Deposit Bank X Mid – Atlantic  -0.275* -0.254* -0.333 -0.309  -0.267* -0.459** -0.451* -0.473* 
    (0.116) (0.105) (0.226) (0.211)  (0.133) (0.126) (0.191) (0.199) 
  New England  0.260 0.180 0.251 0.212  0.115 0.224 0.317 0.292 
    (0.158) (0.154) (0.174) (0.169)  (0.244) (0.241) (0.240) (0.238) 
  Northwest  0.127 0.147 0.122 0.202  -0.069 0.166 0.155 0.303 
    (0.218) (0.195) (0.241) (0.222)  (0.346) (0.279) (0.346) (0.275) 
  Southeast  0.630** 0.541** 0.646** 0.589**  0.029 0.156 0.271 0.214 
    (0.161) (0.154) (0.210) (0.199)  (0.178) (0.185) (0.186) (0.212) 
  Southwest   0.823** 0.770** 0.826** 0.814**  0.093 0.197 0.300 0.275 
   (0.262) (0.244) (0.275) (0.269)  (0.365) (0.338) (0.366) (0.341) 
 Net Interstate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    -0.110+  -0.128+   -0.097  -0.166 
    (0.062)  (0.068)   (0.127)  (0.155) 
 Net Intrastate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    0.167  0.238   -0.630**  -0.444** 
    (0.133)  (0.190)   (0.119)  (0.154) 
 Total Interstate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     0.066 1.215    4.128** 2.532* 
     (1.444) (1.937)    (1.094) (1.274) 
 Total Intrastate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     0.207 0.006    -0.190 -0.355 
    (0.325) (0.313)    (0.388) (0.441) 
Constant 13.532** 13.699** 13.698** 13.699** 13.696** 12.879** 12.892** 12.840** 12.877** 12.835** 
 (0.222) (0.130) (0.131) (0.129) (0.131) (0.311) (0.332) (0.304) (0.329) (0.303) 
Firm and Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 3,607 

































Dependent variable is the log of Loans and Discounts. Bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. Omitted Region is Mid-
Atlantic. Region * Post coeffceints correspond to the specification 
in column (6) in Table 8 Includes controls, deposit bank * Post by 
region, and transfers in 1836 and 1837. 
Dependent variable is the log of Specie. Bars represent 95% confidence 
intervals. Omitted Region is Mid-Atlantic. Region * Post coeffceints 
correspond to the specification in column (12) in Table 8 . Includes 
controls, deposit bank * Post by region, and transfers in 1836 and 1837. 
Figure 7a) Coefficients on Region*Post Variables in 
OLS Regression on log of Loans and Discounts 
Figure 7b) Coefficients on Region*Post Variables in OLS 









































Dependent variable is the log of Circulation. Bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Omitted Region is Mid-Atlantic. Region * Post 
coeffceints correspond to the specification in column (6) in Table  9  . 
Includes controls, deposit bank * Post by region, and transfers in 
1836 and 1837. 
Dependent variable is the log of Deposits. Bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals. Omitted Region is Mid-Atlantic. Region * Post 
coeffceints correspond to the specification in column (12) in Table 9   . 
Includes controls, deposit bank * Post by region, and transfers in 1836 
and 1837. 
Figure 8a) Coefficients on Region*Post Variables in 
OLS Regression on log of Circulation 
Figure 8b) Coefficients on Region*Post Variables in 




Table 10: All U.S. Bank Balance Sheets 1830 to 1842: OLS Regression on Assets 
Note: The first row presents the average amount of loans and discounts, and specie from Jan 1836 to May 1837; the standard deviation is presented in the brackets below. 
Observations are from January 1830 to January 1842. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects as well as controls for age, pre specie reserve ratio, pre cash reserve ratio, 
pre log capital, state, and a dummy for being located in a Major city all interacted with a post panic indicator. Standard errors are clustered by bank. Columns (1) to (6) present 
regressions on the log of Loans and Discounts. Columns (7) to (12) present regressions on the log of Specie and Cash Items. Robust standard errors are presented in the 
parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES log Loans and Discounts log Specie and Cash Items 





Post Panic X Deposit Bank  0.011     0.065     
   (0.042)     (0.099)     
 Deposit Bank X Mid – Atlantic  -0.061 -0.088 -0.146+ -0.171*  -0.231* -0.255* -0.482** -0.492** 
    (0.054) (0.058) (0.087) (0.083)  (0.110) (0.104) (0.185) (0.185) 
  New England  0.250** 0.228** 0.272** 0.258**  0.723** 0.737** 0.829** 0.817** 
    (0.081) (0.088) (0.086) (0.085)  (0.230) (0.228) (0.228) (0.226) 
  Northwest  -0.060 -0.007 -0.031 0.048  0.355 0.383 0.488* 0.531* 
    (0.167) (0.150) (0.170) (0.148)  (0.234) (0.233) (0.248) (0.257) 
  Southeast  -0.004 -0.032 0.051 0.029  0.077 0.089 0.275 0.262 
    (0.089) (0.090) (0.104) (0.096)  (0.142) (0.140) (0.170) (0.170) 
  Southwest   0.052 0.048 0.089 0.099  0.419* 0.431* 0.565** 0.570** 
   (0.128) (0.117) (0.126) (0.117)  (0.178) (0.170) (0.186) (0.188) 
 Net Interstate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    -0.085+  -0.100+   -0.017  -0.056 
    (0.049)  (0.051)   (0.060)  (0.065) 
 Net Intrastate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    0.008  0.074   -0.082  0.096 
    (0.060)  (0.077)   (0.124)  (0.170) 
 Total Interstate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     0.797 1.400*    3.275** 3.822* 
     (0.576) (0.674)    (1.251) (1.626) 
 Total Intrastate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     0.173 0.091    0.342 0.289 
    (0.183) (0.179)    (0.302) (0.305) 
Constant 14.355** 14.314** 14.306** 14.308** 14.303** 12.415** 12.384** 12.377** 12.367** 12.367** 
 (0.127) (0.133) (0.131) (0.129) (0.130) (0.119) (0.124) (0.120) (0.117) (0.116) 
Firm and Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 




Table 11: All U.S. Bank Balance Sheets 1830 to 1842: OLS Regression on Assets 
 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (10) (11) (12) 
VARIABLES log Circulation log Deposits 





Post Panic X Deposit Bank  0.067     -0.263**     
   (0.072)     (0.084)     
 Deposit Bank X Mid – Atlantic  -0.064 -0.034 -0.226 -0.231  -0.309** -0.449** -0.559** -0.624** 
    (0.108) (0.091) (0.206) (0.190)  (0.111) (0.102) (0.171) (0.171) 
  New England  0.182 0.106 0.207 0.169  0.206 0.286 0.363* 0.369* 
    (0.141) (0.128) (0.159) (0.135)  (0.182) (0.181) (0.176) (0.174) 
  Northwest  0.047 0.046 0.081 0.161  0.046 0.209 0.240 0.368 
    (0.236) (0.217) (0.253) (0.239)  (0.309) (0.270) (0.309) (0.271) 
  Southeast  0.430** 0.348** 0.519** 0.488**  -0.193 -0.122 0.048 0.025 
    (0.114) (0.099) (0.175) (0.154)  (0.150) (0.153) (0.159) (0.168) 
  Southwest   0.414 0.371 0.469+ 0.482+  -0.046 0.025 0.144 0.156 
   (0.266) (0.254) (0.264) (0.258)  (0.332) (0.309) (0.325) (0.308) 
 Net Interstate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    -0.085+  -0.113*   -0.098  -0.146 
    (0.050)  (0.053)   (0.083)  (0.091) 
 Net Intrastate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    0.265*  0.403*   -0.479**  -0.280* 
    (0.118)  (0.173)   (0.096)  (0.137) 
 Total Interstate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     1.104 3.008+    4.440** 3.832** 
     (1.317) (1.786)    (0.981) (1.295) 
 Total Intrastate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     0.404 0.265    0.129 0.065 
    (0.285) (0.268)    (0.399) (0.398) 
Constant 12.732** 12.962** 12.970** 12.949** 12.962** 12.516** 12.386** 12.346** 12.372** 12.343** 
 (0.287) (0.245) (0.246) (0.243) (0.244) (0.295) (0.293) (0.275) (0.289) (0.275) 
Firm and Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 5,793 
R-squared 0.853 0.853 0.854 0.853 0.854 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.903 
Note: The first row presents the average amount of notes in circulation, and deposits from Jan 1836 to May 1837; the standard deviation is presented in the brackets below. 
Observations are from January 1830 to January 1842. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects as well as controls for age, pre specie reserve ratio, pre cash reserve ratio, 
pre log capital, state, and a dummy for being located in a Major city all interacted with a post panic indicator. Standard errors are clustered by bank. Columns (1) to (6) present 












Figure 9a) shows the interbank payments system observed from January 
1835 to January 1836. The red dots represent a bank in New York. The 
thickness of the line corresponds to the amount on deposit. Blue edges 
represent an interstate relationship. Source: U.S Congress Senate 
Document No. 312, 24th Congress 1st session.  
Figure 9b) shows the interbank payments system observed from Jan 1835 to Jan 
1836 for New York Deposit Banks.  The thickness of the line corresponds to the 
amount on deposit. Blue edges represent an interstate relationship. Source: U.S 
















Figure 12: Total Amount on Deposit in New York between 1835 to 1836  
 
Total amount on deposit in New York between Jan 1835 to Jan 1836, in tens thousands. Only banks that 














Figure 13 shows the number of Banks in Each State included in the U.S Bank Balance Sheet Dataset after 
merging with the network variables. The transparent grey bars represent the number of banks on 






















Pre Panic (1836 – 1837 ) 
Difference in Mean 
Pre and Post Panic  






























Eigenvector centrality of the bank in the network. 
Measures a bank’s centrality relative to the centrality of 
the bank it is connected to. Values are between 0 and 1, 
and the calculate incorporates directionality and size of 
















Total number of connections the Bank has in the 








Betweenness centrality of the bank in the network. 
Measures the importance of a node in the connectivity of 
the network. Calculation sees how many of shortest 








Local Clustering Coefficient of the bank in the network. 
Measures how clustered the banks and its neighbors are 
and is calculated as the proportion of links between 
banks within the neighborhood divided by the number of 






Indicator variable for if the Bank is in a major city 











Note: 3174 observations, 222 Banks, data observed from January 1830 to January 1842.  







Table 13: Interbank Payments System 1835 to 1839: OLS Regression on Bank Deposits 
Note: The first row presents the average amount of Deposits from Jan 1836 to May 1837; the standard deviation is presented in the brackets below. 
Observations are from January 1835 to January 1839. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects as well as controls for age, pre specie 
reserve ratio, pre cash reserve ratio, pre log capital, state, and a dummy for being located in a Major city all interacted with a post panic indicator. 
Standard errors are clustered by bank. Columns (1) to (4) present results for all U.S. banks. Columns (5) to (8) present results for all U.S. banks 
except for those in New York. Standard errors are presented in the parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 A. All U.S. Banks B. All U.S. Banks except NY 
VARIABLES log Deposits 
Mean 1836 – 1837 (Pre-Panic) 
367,700 
(581,944) 
Post Panic X          
 Deposit Bank -0.318**  -0.300+ -0.297 -0.418**  -0.066 -0.294+ 
  (0.096)  (0.157) (0.182) (0.130)  (0.162) (0.177) 
 Log on Deposit in NY in 1836       -0.002 0.005 
        (0.013) (0.013) 
 
Deposit Bank X Log on Deposit in NY in 
1836        -0.060** -0.068** 
        (0.023) (0.023) 
 Eigenvector Centrality  -0.724** -0.221 -0.213  -0.964**  -0.601* 
   (0.146) (0.173) (0.269)  (0.162)  (0.274) 
 Eigenvector Centrality X Deposit Bank     -0.013    0.489 
     (0.333)    (0.377) 
Includes Transfers No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Firm and Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,032 2,032 2,032 2,032 1,560 1,560 1,560 1,560 




Table 14: Interbank Payments System 1830 to 1842: OLS Regression on Bank Deposits 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 A. All U.S. Banks B. All U.S. Banks except NY 
VARIABLES log Deposits 
Mean 1836 – 1837 (Pre-Panic) 
367,700 
(581,944) 
Post Panic X          
 Deposit Bank -0.327**  -0.500** -0.578** -0.394**  -0.203 -0.516** 
  (0.084)  (0.164) (0.172) (0.095)  (0.128) (0.167) 
 Log on Deposit in NY in 1836       -0.006 0.001 
        (0.012) (0.012) 
 
Deposit Bank X Log on Deposit in NY in 
1836        -0.028 -0.053* 
        (0.019) (0.022) 
 Eigenvector Centrality  -0.646** -0.177 -0.453+  -0.638**  -0.623* 
   (0.134) (0.159) (0.266)  (0.159)  (0.310) 
 Eigenvector Centrality X Deposit Bank     0.422    0.795* 
     (0.302)    (0.373) 
Includes Transfers No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Firm and Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 2,571 2,571 2,571 2,571 
R-squared 0.885 0.885 0.887 0.888 0.882 0.882 0.883 0.885 
Note: The first row presents the average amount of Deposits from Jan 1836 to May 1837; the standard deviation is presented in the brackets below. 
Observations are from January 1830 to January 1842. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects as well as controls for age, pre specie 
reserve ratio, pre cash reserve ratio, pre log capital, state, and a dummy for being located in a Major city all interacted with a post panic indicator. 
Standard errors are clustered by bank. Columns (1) to (4) present results for all U.S. banks. Columns (5) to (8) present results for all U.S. banks 







Figure 14: Number of Banks per State included in the U.S Banknote Discounts Dataset  
 
The transparent grey bars represent the number of banks in 1837 that opened before and closed after the 
Panic. The dark shaded area indicates the number of bank in each state in the final dataset.   
 





























Table 16: All U.S. Banknote Discounts: OLS Regression on Banknote Discount 
 
Note: Observations are from January 1836 to January 1838. All regressions include firm and time fixed effects as well as controls for age, pre log capital, state, and a dummy for 
being located in a Major city all interacted with a post panic indicator. Standard errors are clustered by bank. Columns (1) to (5) present regressions on the banknote discount 
which is measured as a percent. Columns (6) and (7) present regressions after removing outliers. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Discount  
Post Panic X Deposit Bank  0.203+     0.228**  
   (0.116)     (0.083)  
 Deposit Bank X Mid – Atlantic  0.362* 0.497** 0.541* 0.572**  0.363** 
    (0.184) (0.187) (0.221) (0.219)  (0.099) 
  New England  -0.404* -0.358+ -0.391+ -0.381+  -0.122 
    (0.193) (0.187) (0.199) (0.196)  (0.093) 
  Northwest  -0.214 -0.353 -0.231 -0.430  0.217 
    (0.395) (0.356) (0.404) (0.383)  (0.254) 
  Southeast  -0.760* -0.710* -0.780* -0.778*  -0.564** 
    (0.308) (0.295) (0.333) (0.317)  (0.207) 
  Southwest   0.374 0.256 0.258 0.187  0.349 
   (0.393) (0.384) (0.399) (0.400)  (0.372) 
 Net Interstate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    0.294+  0.330  0.236 
    (0.174)  (0.241)  (0.205) 
 Net Intrastate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    -0.119  -0.241  -0.017 
    (0.127)  (0.249)  (0.144) 
 Total Interstate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     -0.502 -2.264  -0.120 
     (0.972) (2.052)  (1.004) 
 Total Intrastate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital     -0.518* 0.035  -0.134 
    (0.236) (0.508)  (0.404) 
Constant 5.172** 5.200** 5.202** 5.198** 5.203** 5.167** 5.191** 
 (0.061) (0.072) (0.073) (0.071) (0.073) (0.060) (0.070) 
Firm and Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19,070 19,070 19,070 19,070 19,070 18,862 18,862 




Table 17: All U.S. Banknote Discounts: OLS Regression on Banknote Discount 
 
Note: All regressions include firm and time fixed effects as well as controls for age, pre log capital, state, and a dummy for being located in a Major city all interacted with a post 
panic indicator. Standard errors are clustered by bank. Columns (4) to (5) and (9) to (10) present regressions after removing outliers. Panel A is all observations from Jan 1835 to 
Jan 1839 and Panel B is observations from Jan 1830 to Jan 1840. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 A: Jan 1835 to Jan 1839 B: Jan 1830 to Jan 1840 
VARIABLES Discount 
Post Panic X Deposit Bank  0.030   0.217**  -0.007   0.137*  
   (0.153)   (0.061)  (0.123)   (0.057)  
 Deposit Bank X Mid – Atlantic  0.160 0.232  0.280**  0.230 0.271  0.273** 
    (0.253) (0.252)  (0.060)  (0.193) (0.183)  (0.050) 
  New England  -0.354 -0.377  -0.158*  -0.382+ -0.394  -0.202** 
    (0.334) (0.349)  (0.065)  (0.231) (0.243)  (0.052) 
  Northwest  -0.207 -0.251  0.269*  -0.123 -0.122  0.263+ 
    (0.430) (0.405)  (0.133)  (0.369) (0.333)  (0.137) 
  Southeast  -0.412 -0.479  -0.365*  -0.523 -0.575+  -0.385** 
    (0.434) (0.465)  (0.164)  (0.324) (0.348)  (0.137) 
  Southwest   0.163 0.102  0.214  -0.792 -0.820  -0.414 
   (0.481) (0.488)  (0.382)  (0.790) (0.775)  (0.409) 
 Net Interstate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    -0.007  -0.007   -0.070  -0.051 
    (0.166)  (0.080)   (0.139)  (0.053) 
 Net Intrastate Transfers 1836 as % of Capital    -0.201  0.088   -0.123  0.065 
    (0.226)  (0.068)   (0.162)  (0.051) 
 Total Interstate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital    -2.306  0.830   -1.498  0.629 
    (2.255)  (0.521)   (1.653)  (0.424) 
 Total Intrastate Transfers 1837 as % of Capital    -0.043  -0.309+   -0.115  -0.304** 
   (0.467)  (0.181)   (0.372)  (0.115) 
Constant 5.103** 5.137** 5.138** 4.880** 4.903** 6.941** 6.877** 6.876** 6.928** 6.888** 
 (0.234) (0.245) (0.247) (0.168) (0.187) (0.164) (0.151) (0.149) (0.174) (0.152) 
           
Observations 36,370 36,370 36,370 35,947 35,947 57,482 57,482 57,482 56,955 56,955 





Figure 15 shows the estimated effect of deposit bank status on banknote discounts for months before 
during and after the panic. January 1836 to January 1838. 
 
 
Figure 16: Percent Change in the Average 
Banknote Discount from each state  
Pre and Post Panic 
 
Darker shades correspond with a greater 
increase in the average banknote discount. The 
values in the table on the left correspond to the 
shading on the map. 
State Percent Change 
Alabama 2.23 
Connecticut 0.06 













North Carolina 0.24 
New Hampshire 0.00 
New Jersey 0.90 
New York -0.03 
Ohio 0.72 
Pennsylvania 0.27 
Rhode Island 0.00 











Table 18: Summary Statistics: Bank Failure 
Variable Description mean sd min max 
Failed38 
If the Bank Failed between May 
1837 and June 1838 0.019 0.136 0 1 
FailedClosed39 
If the Bank Failed or closed between 
May 1837 and October 1839 0.070 0.256 0 1 
Failed39 
If the Bank Failed between May 
1837 and October 1839 0.027 0.161 0 1 
Age 
Age of the Bank at the time of the 
Panic in years 12.223 11.504 0.194 55.92 
Banking Capital 
Indicator for if the Bank is located in 
the Banking Capital in the State 0.298 0.458 0 1 
Deposit Bank 
Indicator for if the Bank was a 
deposit bank in 1833, 1835, or 1836 0.129 0.336 0 1 
Pre Log Capital 
Log of the capital observed in the 
period closest but before the panic  12.202 1.092 8.52 15.76 
Pre Reserve Ratio 
 The reserve ratio observed in the 
period closest but before the panic, 
calculated as (specie + cash items) / 
(Circulation + Deposits + (Due to – 
Due From)).  0.157 0.168 0.0005 0.9642 
 
 
Table 19: Logistic Regression on the Probability of Failing  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES 
Failed from May 1837  
to June 1838 
Failed from May 1837  
to October 1839 
              
Pre Log Capital  -0.664+ -1.052+  -0.374 -1.154* 
  (0.366) (0.583)  (0.293) (0.503) 
Deposit Bank 1.247* 1.971** 2.668** 0.753 1.189+ 1.846* 
 (0.624) (0.761) (0.908) (0.584) (0.676) (0.879) 
       
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
State FE No No Yes No No Yes 
Observations 641 640 407 641 640 417 
Note: Controls include age, pre specie reserve ratio, pre log capital, and a dummy for being located in a 
‘banking capital’. Columns (1) to (3) present logistic regressions on the probability of failing between 
May 1837 to June 1838, which is a month after the resumption. Columns (4) to (6) logistic regressions on 
the probability of failing between May 1837 to October 1839, before the Panic of 1839. Standard errors 
are presented in the parentheses. ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1 
